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Bundling is widespread in multichannel television markets.1 In theory, bundling 
can be a profitable form of price discrimination. It makes consumer tastes more 
homogenous and can facilitate surplus extraction, but has ambiguous effects on total 
welfare (Stigler 1963; Adams and Yellen 1976). Regulations mandating à la carte 
pricing would radically alter the choice sets of the roughly 110 million US televi-
sion households who collectively spend more than $50 billion annually and watch 
an average of more than seven hours of television per day. This paper predicts the 
impact of such regulation on the distribution of consumer and producer welfare.
There are widely differing opinions among policymakers, consumers, and 
industry participants about the effects of mandating à la carte pricing in the United 
States.2 This lack of consensus is partly because regulations mandating unbundling 
1 Multichannel television refers to subscription-based television services. In the United States, these are provided by 
cable television systems, direct-broadcast satellite (DBS) providers, and wireline video operators (especially incum-
bent telephone service providers). They are together called multichannel video program distributors (MVPDs).
2 In addition to numerous articles in the popular press (e.g., Reuters 2003; Schatz 2006), the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has published two reports analyzing à la carte pricing (FCC 2004, 2006). 
The National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA) has a webpage summarizing industry opposition 
to à la carte at http://www.ncta.com/IssueBrief.aspx?contentId=15. Supporters of à la carte include Consumers 
Union (http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_telecom_and_utilities/000925.html) and The Parents Television 
Council (http://www.howcableshouldbe.com/). According to a 2007 poll by Zogby, 52 percent of cable subscribers 
sampled supported à la carte pricing (http://www.zogby.com/news/readnews.cfm?ID=1377).
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have not been implemented in enough similar circumstances to provide direct evi-
dence.3 Local experimentation would be informative about changes at the retail 
level, but à la carte would also affect industry-wide negotiations between content 
providers and distributors. We specify and estimate an industry model to evaluate 
à la carte pricing.
We model viewership, demand, pricing, bundling, and input-market bargaining of 
multichannel television services. We first combine television viewership (ratings) 
data with bundle-market shares and prices to estimate the distribution of household 
preferences for each of 50 cable television channels. We next estimate the input 
costs that distributors, such as Comcast or DirecTV, currently pay to content con-
glomerates, such as ABC Disney (which owns ESPN and The Disney Channel, 
among others) or Viacom (which owns MTV and Comedy Central, among others), 
for each of these channels using aggregate cost data and observed pricing and bun-
dling decisions. The central innovation of our model is accounting for the change in 
distributors’ input costs that result from bargaining between content and distribution 
in an à la carte world. To do so, we use the demand and cost estimates to estimate the 
parameters of a bilateral oligopoly bargaining model of the input market. Holding 
the estimated demand and bargaining parameters fixed, we simulate a world where 
distributors are forced to unbundle channels, critically allowing for the renegotiation 
of contracts between channel conglomerates and distributors.
In these counterfactual simulations, equilibrium input costs are an estimated 
103.0 percent higher than when distributors sell bundles. These higher costs are 
passed into prices, offsetting the welfare benefits to consumers from being able to 
purchase individual channels. We estimate that, accounting for higher equilibrium 
input costs, consumer welfare changes between − 5.4 percent and 0.2 percent and 
total welfare changes between − 1.7 percent and 6.0 percent. Implementation or 
marketing costs associated with à la carte would likely reduce both in the short run.
The model has three types of agents: consumers, downstream distributors, and 
upstream channels. We estimate consumer preferences using both individual-level 
and market-level data on viewership, i.e., which channels consumers watch and for 
how long, and market-level data on bundle purchases, i.e., which bundles of chan-
nels consumers purchase, what channels they contain, and what prices are charged. 
We assume that the more a consumer watches a television channel, the more she is 
willing to pay for it. The viewership data provides the empirical evidence necessary 
for flexibly estimating a high-dimensional distribution of preferences for channels. 
The bundle purchase data provides the empirical evidence necessary to estimate 
how households trade off their utility from viewing channels with the price they 
have to pay for a bundle of those channels.
On the supply side, downstream distributors compete with each other by choos-
ing both bundles and prices and by negotiating input costs with upstream channel 
conglomerates. We assume that observed prices and bundles are a Nash equilibrium 
given estimated preferences. We estimate input costs as those that make the Nash 
equilibrium assumption hold. We use the procedure in Pakes et al. (2007) to incor-
porate a subset of the necessary conditions implied by a Nash equilibrium in bundle 
3 Internationally, Canada, Hong Kong, and India have introduced various forms of regulations mandating unbun-
dling in multichannel television markets, but idiosyncratic features of these regulations limit generalizations.
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choice into the estimation. This restricts estimated input costs to reflect that adding 
or dropping a channel from an observed bundle should reduce profits on average for 
the firms making the decision.
To model the determination of input costs, we fix an industry bargaining pro-
tocol based on the model of Horn and Wolinsky (1988). The bargaining protocol 
features bilateral meetings between conglomerates of channels and distributors 
whose outcomes impose externalities on other firms due to downstream competi-
tion. We employ the equilibrium concept of contract equilibrium, as in Cremer 
and Riordan (1987), which requires that no pair of distributor and conglomerate 
would like to change their agreement given all other agreements. One notable 
empirical paper that also studies bargaining with externalities due to downstream 
competition is the analysis of hospital-HMO negotiations in the US in Ho (2009). 
Our paper contributes to this line of research by using a bargaining model that 
includes Ho’s take-it-or-leave-it offers as a special case. We estimate channel 
conglomerate-distributor–specific bargaining parameters that produce the esti-
mated input costs in equilibrium.
The estimated distribution of channel preferences replicates many features of 
the ratings data. For example, willingness-to-pay (WTP) for Black Entertainment 
Television (BET) is estimated to be much higher on average for black households. 
WTP for Nickelodeon and Disney Channel are estimated to be higher on average 
for family households. Average estimated own-price elasticities for basic cable, 
expanded basic cable, and satellite services are − 4.1, − 6.3, and − 5.4, respectively.
Median estimated price-cost margins are 44 percent. We estimate that large dis-
tributors, such as Comcast, have about 17 percent lower input costs than small, 
independent distributors.
The estimated bargaining parameters reject take-it-or-leave-it offers as a model of 
the input market. On average, we estimate that distributors have higher bargaining 
parameters than channel conglomerates for small channel conglomerates, but that 
the situation is reversed for large channel conglomerates. Among distributors, small 
cable operators and satellite providers have slightly less estimated bargaining power 
than large cable operators.
We use these estimates to simulate the welfare effects of an à la carte pricing 
regulation. In the counterfactual simulation, we consider an economic environ-
ment with one large and one small cable market (each served by a single cable 
system), where the cable system and each of two “national” satellite distributors 
compete by charging a fixed fee and separate prices for each of the almost 50 cable 
television channels in our specification. We also simulate the welfare effects of 
theme tiers and a bundle-sized-pricing regulation as in Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen 
(2011). In all cases, we allow for input-market renegotiation between channel 
conglomerates and distributors.
There are two countervailing forces that largely determine our results. First, for 
fixed input costs, unbundling unlocks consumer surplus. If we do not allow for 
input-market renegotiation (i.e., input costs in an à la carte world stay at their bun-
dle levels), forcing channels to be offered à la carte increases consumer welfare by 
an estimated 19.2 percent and reduces industry profits by 12.7 percent. Allowing 
renegotiation, however, increases costs by an estimated 103.0 percent. Prices fol-
low suit, making the average consumer indifferent (increasing consumer surplus by 
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0.2 percent), increasing industry profits by 4.8 percent, and decreasing estimated 
total surplus from 4.1 percent to 2.4 percent.4 Implementation or marketing costs 
would likely reduce all of these in the short run.
These estimates of the consequences of à la carte are for a baseline set of assump-
tions about demand, cost, and the nature of bargaining between channels and dis-
tributors that are described in detail throughout the paper. Where practicable, we 
have assessed the robustness of our conclusions to changes in these assumptions. 
For example, changes in assumptions regarding distributor markups under à la carte 
and the shape of and correlation between household preferences for channels yield 
qualitatively similar results: estimated consumer surplus changes between − 5.4 per-
cent and 0.2 percent, industry profits between 2.4 percent and 12.8 percent, and total 
surplus between − 1.7 percent and 6.0 percent.5
Some of our assumptions cannot easily be evaluated, however. One important 
assumption is that we infer greater utility for channels when they are watched more. 
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations in a simplified environment for data generated 
by an alternative viewership model that allows for channels that are viewed for a 
short time to have higher valuations than channels that are viewed for a longer time.6 
We find that our model predicts poorly outcomes for individual channels in this 
case, but still predicts well the overall (i.e., across-channel) welfare effects of à la 
carte. Another important assumption is that we analyze short-run effects taking the 
identities and qualities of channels as given. In the long run, channels could enter, 
exit, and change how much they spend on programming, with important welfare 
effects in their own right. Finally, changes in consumer learning, preference forma-
tion, and/or so-called “behavioral effects” (e.g., Bertini and Wathieu 2008) could 
also be important in a move from bundles to à la carte sales. The interpretation of 
our results should bear these assumptions in mind.
This paper is related to a number of empirical papers evaluating policy issues in 
these markets (Crawford 2000, Chipty 2001, Goolsbee and Petrin 2004) as well as 
several papers addressing the identical topic. Rennhoff and Serfes (2009) develop 
a two-channel, two-distributor model with consumer preferences distributed uni-
formly on a circle to analytically study bundling and the wholesale market. Rennhoff 
and Serfes (2008) estimate a logit demand system for channels. In both studies, they 
conclude that à la carte regulations would likely increase consumer surplus, but the 
underlying modeling and distributional assumptions are too strong to adequately 
evaluate those claims. Crawford (2008) tests the implications of bundling in cable 
markets using reduced-form techniques. While suggestive, he does not identify the 
structure of channel demand required to estimate the welfare effects of bundling. 
The closest related work is due to Byzalov (2010). He estimates a model of demand 
for multichannel television using household-level survey data from a cross-section 
of four large designated market areas (DMAs) in 2004. He finds that forcing cable 
4 Bundle-sized pricing and theme tiers are even worse for consumers (reducing welfare by an estimated 8.8 
percent and 22.0 percent, respectively) as they still induce higher input costs, but do not permit households to select 
only the channels that they want.
5 Bargaining outcomes are much more important for predicting surplus: if renegotiated input costs were to rise 
by half (double) the 103.0 percent we estimate, estimated consumer surplus would increase by 18.5 percent (fall 
by 27.6 percent). This merely emphasizes the importance of estimating a bargaining game and simulating coun-
terfactual bargaining outcomes in order to accurately understand the effects of unbundling in television markets.
6 Channels offering sports programming, for example, may be watched less but valued more.
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distributors to offer theme tiers would decrease average consumer welfare at fixed 
wholesale prices. His household data are advantageous compared to our individual 
data in that they record the viewing behavior of all the adult television viewers 
in the household, but his market data are limited to a small sample of markets in 
2004 rather than multiple thousands of systems over ten years as in this study.7 
Furthermore, he neither evaluates the welfare of full à la carte (Full ALC) (i.e., hav-
ing each channel itself available for sale) nor computes renegotiated input costs in 
his counterfactual analysis.8
I. Intuition for Results
The contribution of this paper can be understood by appreciating the insights of, 
and interaction between, two theoretical literatures in economics. The first evalu-
ates the welfare consequences of bundling when input costs to the bundling firm are 
fixed (Stigler 1963; Adams and Yellen 1976). The second models how those input 
costs are determined in a bilateral bargaining setting under oligopoly (Horn and 
Wolinsky 1988). The ultimate welfare effects of à la carte depend on the interaction 
of the effects analyzed in these literatures, in particular on the magnitude of input 
cost increases that are likely to arise under à la carte. The three figures we now 
describe provide intuition for our results.
Figure 1 demonstrates the price-discrimination incentive for bundling by a 
monopolist. Consider two goods with dispersed valuations and fixed marginal costs 
of zero given by the dashed lines in the figure. No matter the prices it charges, pric-
ing each good individually requires a seller to miss out on the surplus from high-
valuation consumers willing to pay more than its price and low-valuation consumers 
willing to pay less than its price but more than its cost. Compare that to the demand 
curve for the bundle. As long as valuations between the two goods are not perfectly 
correlated, consumers’ valuation of the bundle will be less dispersed than those for 
the components, allowing the seller to capture more of the combined surplus with a 
single price. While we choose valuations that are highly negatively correlated in the 
figure to emphasize this point, it is quite general: à la carte regulations can unlock 
surplus and improve consumer welfare, for given input costs.9
The complication is that marginal costs can change under à la carte. Forgetting 
bundling for a moment, consider the determination of input costs for a single good 
in a bilateral monopoly with linear fee contracts, as in the two leftmost panels of 
Figure 2. For a given input cost from the y-axis in the first panel, the downstream 
distributor in the second panel maximizes profit by choosing price to equate mar-
ginal revenue and marginal cost. The area of the upper producer surplus rectangle 
7 Having observations on the adults within a household allows him to address the extent to which within-
household correlation in tastes is an important for the discriminatory incentives to bundle.
8 The results we present here are also related to results we have previously disseminated in working-paper ver-
sions of this paper and related work. As our qualitative conclusions about the welfare effects of à la carte have 
changed in the process of conducting this research, we will describe how and why our conclusions have changed, 
but do so after introducing the ideas in the next section.
9 There is a long literature that has established this point for monopolists facing particular distributions of 
demand and cost (Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee 1984). Fang and Norman (2006) show that if preferences 
are symmetric and log-concave and average willingness-to-pay is greater than cost, then bundling is always more 
profitable than component sales.
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( Π f ) is the downstream seller’s profit; the area of the lower producer surplus rect-
angle ( Π c ) is the upstream producer’s profit. The bargaining literature cited above 
models equilibrium input costs with linear fee contracts as being determined as a 
function of a weighted geometric average of these two profits called the Nash prod-
uct. The left panel traces out the Nash product for each possible input cost.10 The 
equilibrium input cost maximizes the Nash product.
The third and fourth panels of Figure 2 combine these two forces to determine 
input costs under bundling versus à la carte. The figure repeats the first two panels 
for two goods that have the same underlying mean valuations, but different disper-
sions. One can see that the equilibrium input cost for the more dispersed (à la carte) 
good ( τ alc * ) is higher than that for the less dispersed (bundled) good ( τ bun * ). For many 
distributions of preferences, this drives up costs.11
The key to understanding the welfare effects of à la carte is to know how much 
input costs would rise under mandatory à la carte. If modest, the insights of the 
bundling literature likely obtain and à la carte could be consumer- and total welfare–
enhancing. If extreme, prices under à la carte will also be high, making it much more 
likely to be welfare-reducing. How much input costs rise under à la carte in practice 
10 In this demonstration, we use equal weights. In our results, we estimate  ζ f K , the weighting for each pair of 
distributor and channel conglomerate.
11 There is an additional, opposite effect of à la carte pricing on input costs. Bundling creates a negative external-
ity in that a higher input cost for one channel weakens demand for the other channels in the bundle and this isn’t 
accounted for by upstream channels in their negotiations. This makes input costs higher under bundling; eliminating 
it pushes input costs lower under à la carte. On average, we find input costs rise considerably, so in aggregate this 
externality effect is dominated by the niche pricing effect described in the text. For some channels, however, it is 
the dominant effect.
Figure 1. Dispersion in WTP for Components Is Higher than Dispersion  
in WTP for a Bundle
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particularly depends on the structure of preferences for individual channels and the 
relative bargaining power of channels and distributors. These are the focus of our 
econometric estimation in the sections to follow.12
II. The Data
We divide our data into two categories: market data, which measure house-
holds’ purchasing decisions or firms’ production decisions, and viewership data, 
also called ratings, which measure households’ utilization of the cable channels 
available to them.
Our market data comes from two sources: Warren Communications and SNL 
Kagan. Warren produces the Television and Cable Factbook Electronic Edition 
monthly (Warren Communication News (1997–2007), henceforth, Factbook). 
The Factbook provides data at the local cable market level on the composition 
of cable television bundles, their prices and market shares, cable system owner-
ship, and other system characteristics. SNL Kagan produces the Economics of 
Basic Cable Networks yearly (SNL Kagan (2006), henceforth, EBCN). EBCN 
provides data at the level of channels on a variety of revenue, cost, and subscriber 
quantities.
12 The trade-off between unbundling all offered TV channels (i.e., Full ALC) and higher input costs due to 
renegotiated bargaining under à la carte is the driving force in predicting consumer welfare benefits of à la carte. 
This paper is the combination of what was two separate research papers, each looking at measuring the welfare 
benefits of à la carte. The first paper, last circulated in February 2009, by both authors (Crawford and Yurukoglu 
2009), allowed Full ALC, but not input bargaining effects and, like previous work by the first author using simi-
lar assumptions (e.g., Crawford 2008), unsurprisingly found significant consumer welfare benefits. The second 
paper, last circulated in April 2009, by the second author (Yurukoglu 2009), introduced the bargaining model and 
input bargaining effects, but couldn’t do so while allowing Full ALC, focusing instead on a blend of Bundle-Sized 
Pricing (Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen 2011) and a few channels being offered ALC whose effects were similar to pure 
bundling. This paper unsurprisingly found very modest consumer welfare benefits. It is only in the current paper 
(combining those research projects) that we have developed methods to flexibly allow both Full ALC and input 
bargaining effects to permit the data to tell us the relative importance of each.
Figure 2. Nash Bargaining for Input Costs: Bundling versus à la Carte
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A. Cable System (Factbook) and Satellite Data
Our Factbook sample spans the time period 1997–2007. The Factbook collects its 
data by telephone and mail survey of cable systems. The key data in the Factbook 
are the cable system’s bundle compositions, the prices of its bundles, the number of 
monthly subscribers per bundle, the number of homes passed by the cable system, 
and the ownership of the system.
Table 1 and part of Table 2 provide summary statistics for the Factbook data. 
An observation is a system-bundle-year; e.g., NY0108’s Expanded Basic in 2000. 
We observe over 25,000 system-bundle-years, based on over 19,000 system-years 
from over 8,000 systems. Most systems in our data offer a single bundle, while the 
majority of the rest offer just two bundles. Much of our data comes from early in 
the sample period when fewer offerings were the norm.
For each of these bundles and by market type, Table 1 reports the average price 
of the bundle in 2000 dollars, its market share, and the number of cable channels 
Table 1—Factbook Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
All bundles
 Price 25,490 23.46 9.20 0.00 87.06
 Market share 25,490 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.99
 Total cable channels 25,490 20.3 16.1 0 176
Basic-only markets
 Basic service
 Price 14,732 23.70 6.36 0.00 80.25
 Share 14,732 0.54 0.22 0.00 0.99
 Total cable channels 14,732 17.3 9.4 0 95
Basic and expanded basic markets
 Basic service
  Price 4,046 13.49 5.71 0.00 47.67
  Share 4,046 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.89
  Total cable channels 4,046 8.91 7.68 0 56
 Expanded basic service
  Price 4,046 27.39 7.92 0.00 87.06
  Share 4,046 0.57 0.19 0.00 0.97
  Total cable channels 4,046 26.5 10.0 0 77
Basic, exp. basic, and dig. basic markets
 Basic service
  Price 493 13.26 5.60 0.00 38.68
  Share 493 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.65
  Total cable channels 493 8.3 6.3 1 35
 Expanded basic service
  Price 493 34.62 7.81 0.00 61.51
  Share 493 0.39 0.16 0.01 0.84
  Total cable channels 493 47.1 10.7 18 89
 Digital basic service
  Price 493 44.56 10.07 0.00 70.27
  Share 493 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.53
  Total cable channels 493 78.8 19.1 37 176
Notes: An observation is a system-bundle-year. Prices are in 2000 dollars. Market shares are defined as subscrib-
ers divided by homes passed, with homes passed defined as the set of households able to purchase cable service 
from each system. Total cable channels is the sum of over 350 television channels carried by cable systems in 
the Factbook.
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Table 2—Channel Summary Statistics
Cable system carriage Household viewership
Data source Factbook Nielsen MRI
Channel
Any tier
(%)
Basic tier
(%)
Mean
rating
Mean
rating
SD
rating Cume
ABC Family Channel 91.2 75.7 0.4 0.6 1.5 31.6
AMC 55.3 30.9 0.5 0.6 1.4 27.2
Animal Planet 22.8 12.1 0.3 0.6 1.5 34.8
Arts & Entertainment 68.3 48.7 0.7 0.8 1.7 37.8
BET Networks 21.1 10.9 0.4 0.3 1.5 10.6
Bravo 13.3 3.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 14.4
Cartoon Network 29.1 15.7 1.6 0.5 1.8 20.9
CNBC 37.6 19.7 0.2 0.5 1.4 29.5
CNN 94.5 77.5 0.7 1.8 3.0 53.8
Comedy Central 25.1 11.1 0.5 0.5 1.3 27.6
Country Music TV 48.0 37.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 13.5
Court TV 16.2 4.5 0.4 0.4 1.4 18.1
Discovery Channel 88.0 71.6 0.6 1.1 1.9 50.9
Disney Channel 41.6 29.6 1.2 0.5 1.4 21.2
E! Entertainment Television 22.9 11.0 0.3 0.3 0.9 24.4
ESPN 96.7 76.7 0.9 1.1 2.2 40.7
ESPN 2 36.6 21.4 0.3 0.5 1.4 25.2
Food Network 13.6 4.5 0.4 0.5 1.5 26.7
Fox News Channel 20.0 10.0 0.8 1.0 2.2 40.0
Fox Sports Net 19.4 11.3 0.3 0.4 1.2 20.2
FX 21.0 9.9 0.5 0.4 1.2 23.3
GSN 8.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.9 7.4
Golf Channel 10.9 1.8 0.0 0.1 0.6 6.9
Hallmark Channel 8.2 3.3 0.3 0.2 1.0 10.8
HGTV 26.3 13.2 0.6 0.6 1.6 27.5
History Channel 32.0 18.5 0.6 0.8 1.7 37.9
Lifetime 63.2 41.8 0.9 1.0 2.2 34.4
MSNBC 14.4 5.0 0.3 0.5 1.3 30.2
MTV 52.7 30.2 0.7 0.4 1.4 21.8
MTV2 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 7.8
National Geographic Channel 6.5 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 13.2
Nickelodeon 73.8 52.5 1.8 0.4 1.3 17.7
Oxygen 2.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 7.2
Syfy 33.4 18.4 0.5 0.4 1.4 20.9
SoapNet 4.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.6 2.5
Speed Channel 11.8 3.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 7.8
Spike TV 24.0 15.0 0.5 0.4 1.1 18.9
TBS Superstation 96.3 90.7 1.1 0.9 1.7 39.8
The Weather Channel 64.1 46.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 50.3
TLC 45.1 29.9 0.5 0.5 1.3 29.0
TNT 85.2 63.7 1.3 0.9 1.8 41.3
Toon Disney 8.6 2.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 6.1
Travel Channel 16.8 8.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 18.7
TV Guide Channel 19.3 11.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 17.5
TV Land 23.2 15.0 0.8 0.6 1.8 23.9
USA Network 88.8 66.3 1.2 0.8 1.6 37.4
Versus 9.3 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 4.8
VH1 39.6 22.6 0.4 0.3 0.9 18.2
WE: Women’s Entertainment 7.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.5 5.9
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for channels from both our cable system (Factbook) and viewership 
(Nielsen, Mediamark (MRI)) data. The channels reported are those cable channels for which we could get complete 
data from all three channel data sources used in our analysis. The first column reports the average carriage of each 
cable channel on any offered tier of service across our system-years. The second column reports average channel car-
riage on just the basic tier. The last four columns report summary statistics about household viewing patterns across 
channels from our Nielsen and MRI data. The third column reports the average rating for all programs on that channel 
for the four Nielsen sweeps months (February, May, August, November) between 2000 and 2006. The fourth and fifth 
columns report the mean and standard deviation of the fraction of households reporting viewing each channel per hour 
for our sample of MRI households from 2000 to 2007. This is analogous to an average Nielsen rating for that chan-
nel; we therefore call them “ratings” above. The last column reports the fraction of MRI households reporting positive 
viewing for each channel. This is called the channel’s “cume,” short for “cumulative audience.”
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offered. In markets with two or more bundles, the average basic service in our data 
costs about $13.50 and offers about 9 cable channels and the average expanded basic 
bundle costs around $30.00 and offers about 30 cable channels.13
There is variation in the composition of bundles across markets and over time. 
Table 2 presents the share of systems in our sample that offer each of the channels 
in our specification. The first column indicates whether the channel is carried on any 
tier of service, while the second column indicates whether the channel is offered on 
the basic tier. For example, ESPN is carried by almost all systems (96.7 percent) in 
our data. Of these, most (76.7 percent) carry it on basic service. Smaller channels 
are frequently offered on digital service.
Unlike for cable service, satellite offerings do not vary by geography. We col-
lected satellite menus and prices by hand. We then matched this to aggregate satel-
lite market share data at the DMA level from Nielsen Media Research.14
B. Aggregate Channel (SNL Kagan) Data
We use the 2006 edition of the EBCN. The 2006 sample covers 120 cable chan-
nels with yearly observations dating back to 1994 when applicable. Information 
collected includes total subscribers, license fee revenue, advertising revenue, and 
ownership. The data are collected by survey, private communication, consulting 
information, and some estimation. The exact methods used are not disclosed. The 
key variables we use are the average input cost (denoted  τ c for a given channel c 
later in the paper), and the advertising revenue for each channel. The average input 
cost for a channel is its license fee revenue divided by the number of subscribers. It 
measures how much distributors are paying for the channel per subscriber, averaged 
across distributors. In 2007, this ranged from $3.26 for ESPN to $0.03 for MTV2 for 
the roughly 50 channels in our model.
C. Viewership Data
Our viewership data comes from two sources: Nielsen and MRI. The Nielsen data 
is DMA-level tuning (viewing) data (Nielsen Media Research 2007). The MRI data 
are individual-level survey data.
Nielsen DMA Tuning Data.—The Nielsen data comes from the 56 largest DMAs 
for about 50 of the biggest cable channels over the period 2000–2006 in each of the 
“sweeps” months of February, May, July, and November. The main variables are the 
DMA, the program, the channel, and the program’s rating. The rating is the percent-
age of households with at least one television in the DMA viewing the programming 
on that channel.
13 Digital basic packages were made possible by cable systems investments in digital infrastructure in the late 
1990s and 2000s. This dramatically increased the bandwidth available for delivering television channels. Prior 
to digital upgrades, most systems offered simply a basic bundle or a basic bundle and an expanded basic bundle. 
Following the digital upgrades, many systems also offered a higher tier, often called “digital basic.”
14 DMAs correspond to local broadcast television coverage areas. There are usually several cable systems within 
a DMA.
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We aggregate the information across programs on each channel within each 
month of our data. Thus, an observation is a channel-DMA-year-month; e.g., the 
average rating for ESPN in the Boston DMA in February 2004. We have 1,482 such 
combinations. The third column in Table 2 presents the average rating for each of 
the channels in our analysis.
We observe that channels’ ratings vary from DMA to DMA and, within DMAs, 
across months and years. One important type of variation we use is how ratings vary 
with the demographic composition of a DMA. We focus on five demographic fac-
tors: family status, income, race, education, and age.15 Figure 2 in online Appendix 
B provides an illustrative example of the impact demographic characteristics can 
have on ratings by comparing average ratings for Black Entertainment Television 
(BET) across markets. Table 2 in online Appendix B reports correlations in the 
DMA-month-year ratings across a subset of cable channel pairs. Correlations in 
viewing from our household-level data show similar patterns.
MRI Individual-Level Data.—The MRI data comes from surveying a random 
sample of consumers in the US about their media usage, consumer behavior, and 
demographics. They survey roughly 25,000 individuals per year. Our data spans the 
years 2000 to 2007. Individuals report how many hours they watch each of over 75 
cable channels in a given week.
In columns four and five of Table 2, we present the mean and the standard devia-
tion of the fraction of households reporting viewing a certain channel per hour.16 
This is analogous to an average Nielsen rating for that channel and for that reason 
we call them “ratings” in the table. The final column reports what fraction of house-
holds report positive viewing of each channel. In industry parlance, this is known as 
the “cume,” short for “cumulative audience.”
D. Data Quality Issues
About four-fifths of the possible observations in the Factbook on market share and 
price for cable bundles are either missing, not updated from the previous year, or both.17 
We assume this data is missing at random conditional on the observable characteristics 
of the system. Most systems show up at least once in the time period of the data set.
We only observe the aggregate satellite market share at the DMA level (Nielsen 
Media Research 1997–2007). For the demand estimation, we assume that there is 
only one satellite firm offering DirecTV’s Total Choice package (DirectTV 1997–
2007). In reality, both DirecTV and Dish offer three to four tiers of service each.
The MRI data are at the individual level while our model is at the household level. 
To use this data to estimate our model, we create synthetic households by match-
ing individuals to households based on observable characteristics like age, cable 
or satellite subscription, marital status, household income, and race.18 For each 
15 This data is from the US Census Bureau. We follow US Census definitions for each of these variables. Table 3 
in online Appendix B reports sample statistics across the 56 DMAs for which we have ratings data.
16 These fictional households are created from the real individual data as detailed in Section IID.
17 Online Appendix B discusses data quality issues for the datasets used in this paper in more detail.
18 This is one advantage of the data in Byzalov (2010): it reports the viewing for all adult members of a house-
hold, eliminating the need for this kind of imputation.
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observation, we randomly draw an individual-level observation. We then draw more 
individuals with similar characteristics to fill in the other members of the reported 
household size. If several individuals could fit into a given household, we choose at 
random. If individuals who share the same tastes in television tend to marry, then 
with this procedure we will overestimate the number of channels watched by house-
holds, while if opposites attract, we will underestimate that number.
III. The Industry Model
The industry model predicts household demand for multichannel television ser-
vices, household viewership of channels, prices and bundles offered by distributors, 
and distributor channel–specific input costs. This section derives those predictions 
in terms of a variable set of parameters. The next section, on identification, estima-
tion, and inference, picks a particular set of parameters so that the predictions from 
the model align with their empirical counterparts.
In stage 1, channels and distributors bargain bilaterally to decide input costs; in 
stage 2, distributors set prices and bundles; in stage 3, households make purchases; 
and in stage 4, households view television channels. We start from the last stage and 
work backwards.
A. Household Viewing
Let j index a bundle of programming being offered by cable system n in DMA d in 
month-year m (e.g., Comcast Digital Basic in Arlington, Virginia in the Washington, 
DC DMA in November 2003) and let  b dnm be the set of all such bundles.19, 20 We will 
suppress the market subscripts n, d, and m for the moment. Let c index channels and 
let  C j be the set of channels offered in bundle j. We assume the utility to household i 
from spending their time watching television and doing nontelevision activities has 
the Cobb-Douglas in logs form:
(1)   v ij ( t ij ) =  ∑ 
c∈ C j 
 
 
  γ ic log(1 +  t ijc ),
where  t ij is a vector with components  t ijc that denote the number of hours household 
i watches channel c when the channels in bundle j are available, and  γ ic is a param-
eter representing i’s tastes for channel c.21 We will later estimate the distribution 
19 For convenience, we index month-year combinations (e.g., November 2003; May 2004; November 2004) by 
the single index, m.
20 We have two geographic identifiers: cable markets n and Nielsen DMAs d. This is necessary due to the differ-
ent levels of geographic aggregation in our data.
21 One could experiment with richer models of time allocation. For example, one could model a sequence of 
discrete choices of which channel to watch in every fifteen-minute period. The combination of Nielsen ratings and 
recently developed set-top box-tuning data would allow the researcher to estimate such a model. A richer model 
would allow us to test our viewership model against data that detail time-of-day viewing. Additionally, it would 
allow one to transparently impose additional assumptions, such as that viewing during prime time is more valuable 
than viewing during midmorning. Unfortunately, our individual-level viewership data does not contain time-of-day 
viewing. Because of this data limitation and the increased computational requirements for estimating the richer 
model, we employ the simple Cobb-Douglas model of time allocation presented in the text. In online Appendix B, 
we explore the implications of a richer viewership model that allows for consumers to value channels they watch a 
short time more than channels they watch for longer periods.
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of γ allowing for positive or negative correlations in tastes for pairs of channels. 
Households may opt to not watch any channel, and we call this state channel 0, 0 ∈ 
C j ∀j, with  t ij 0 the amount of time household i spends on nontelevision activities and γ i0 their preferences for such activities.
Each household i solves
(2)   max 
 t ij   ∑ c 
 
 γ ic log(1 +  t ijc )
 subject to  ∑ 
c
 
 
 t ijc ≤ T,
with the additional restrictions that the time spent watching any channel must be 
nonnegative, and the time spent on channels not in bundle j is zero.
The solution to this maximization problem yields household i’s indirect utility 
from viewing the channels in bundle j:
(3)   v ij *( γ i ,  C j ) =  ∑ 
c∈ C j 
 
 
  γ ic log(1 +  t ijc * ).
Discussion.—We infer how much a household values a channel relative to other 
channels based on how much time they spend watching that channel relative to 
other channels. This would not be good assumption, for example, if households 
valued the option of watching The Weather Channel in case of bad weather, but 
never watch under normal circumstances or if programming on some channels is 
highly valued but only watched for a short period of time relative to programming 
on other channels (e.g., high-profile sporting events).
Because channels are uniformly sold in large bundles, bundle data alone doesn’t 
provide enough variation to estimate separately household demand for individual 
channels. Viewing data does provide channel-specific variation, but no prices. It is 
the combination of these types of data and the assumption that viewing time informs 
value that enables us to quantify the welfare benefits of à la carte policies.
To address the likely consequences of this assumption for our results, we conduct 
a Monte Carlo exercise as part of our robustness analysis in Section VI that allows 
for channels watched a short time to be valued more than channels watched for lon-
ger periods. A brief summary of our findings is provided there and a full description 
of this exercise and its results is provided in online Appendix B.
B. Bundle Purchases
A household’s choice of cable bundle will depend on their utility from having 
access to the channels in that bundle,  v ij *, as well as other characteristics of the 
bundle and cable system such as the bundle’s price. We assume the utility household 
i derives from subscribing to bundle j in market n in DMA d in month m as
(4)   u ijndm =   v ijndm * +  z jndm ′ ψ +  α i  p jndm +  ξ jndm +  ϵ ijndm ,
656 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW APRIL 2012
where  v ijndm * =  v ijndm * ( γ i ,  C jndm ), from (3), represents the indirect utility to household i 
from viewing the channels available on bundle j,  p jndm is the monthly subscription 
fee of bundle j, and  z jndm are other observed system and bundle characteristics of 
bundle j in market n, DMA d, and month m. For convenience, we will sometimes 
refer to this triple as “market ndm”;  α i = α +  π p  y i , with  y i household i’s income, is 
a taste parameter measuring the marginal utility of income; ψ is a parameter mea-
suring tastes for system and other bundle characteristics; and  ξ jndm and  ϵ ijndm are 
unobserved portions of household i’s utility. We assume that the unobserved term 
has a component which is common to all households in the market,  ξ jndm , and an 
idiosyncratic term,  ϵ ijndm . We further assume that the idiosyncratic term is an i.i.d. 
draw from a type I extreme value distribution whose variance we set to one.22
The components of  z jndm include which multiple system operator (MSO), if any, is 
offering the bundle, the year the bundle is being offered, and bundle name dummies 
(e.g., “Basic,” “Expanded Basic,” etc.);  ξ jndm represents the deviation of unobserved 
demand shocks or bundle attributes from the MSO-year-bundle name mean. These 
unobserved attributes in our data include price and quality of tied Internet service, 
high-definition (HD) service, promotional activity, technical service, and quality 
of equipment. Theory predicts that these unobservable attributes will be correlated 
with price. In the estimation section, we will use instrumental variables to disen-
tangle the effect of price from any correlation with unobservable attributes.
Define  δ jdnm =  z jndm ′ ψ + α  p jndm +  ξ jndm and  μ ijndm =  v ijndm * +  π p  y i  p jndm . Let  F n be 
the distribution of household preferences and demographics in market n. By the dis-
tributional shape assumption on  ϵ ijndm , the model’s predicted market share for bundle 
j in market n in DMA d in month m is
(5)   s jndm =   ∫ 
 
 
 exp(( δ jndm +  μ ijndm )) d F n (i )   ___    
1 +  ∑ k∈ndm   exp (( δ kndm +  μ ikndm )) .
Our model assumes that the amount of time spent by households watching chan-
nels is informative for what they are willing to pay for access to those channels. We 
also assume that all households have nonnegative willingness to pay for channels.
C. Supply: Downstream Distributors
Distributors compete by choosing the composition and price of their bundles to 
maximize profits. We assume that observed prices and bundles form a Nash equilib-
rium of the price and bundle choice game.
The profit of a distributor before fixed costs is
(6)   Π fndm ( b ndm ,  p ndm ) =  ∑ 
jc∈ b fndm 
 
 
 ( p jndm −  ∑ 
c∈ C jndm 
 
 
  τ fc )  s jndm ( b ndm ,  p ndm ),
22 The inclusion of viewing behavior embodied in  v ijndm * has two implications for our bundle purchase model. 
First, we normalize the scale of utility by setting the parameter on  v * to 1. Second, it allows us to estimate the 
variance of ϵ (which is normally not feasible as that is chosen as the utility scale normalization). In practice, this 
estimated variance was small relative to the variance of the other elements of utility, so we (also) set it to one. We 
retain it in the model as it provides a useful computational role in the econometric estimation by smoothing demand 
as a function of the underlying parameters.
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where f denotes distributor, n market, d DMA, m month, and j bundle;  b ndm is a list 
of offered bundles in market ndm with corresponding prices  p ndm , and  b fndm are the 
bundles offered by firm f;  τ fc are distributor-channel specific license fees. Taking a 
distributor’s perspective, we refer to these as “input costs” throughout this paper. 
Distributor f pays channel c a payment of  τ fc for every household that receives chan-
nel c from firm f. Following the nature of programming contracts in the industry, 
these vary by firm and channel, but not across the markets served by firm f.
Separate the bundles offered in market ndm into those offered by distributor f and 
not:  b ndm = ( b fndm ,  b −fndm ). The same for prices:  p ndm = ( p fndm ,  p −fndm ). Nash equilib-
rium assumes
 ∀f and ∀ndm,  b fndm and  p fndm maximize  Π fndm ( b ndm ,  p ndm ) given  b −fndm and  p −fndm .
The Nash assumption implies that bundle prices satisfy the downstream firm’s 
first-order necessary conditions for maximizing profit. Furthermore, if an observed 
bundle is modified by adding or removing a channel, then the profit will be less 
than or equal to the original bundle’s profit, no matter the price of the new bundle. 
Identification and estimation of input costs is partly based on these implications of 
the Nash assumption.
We do not have a uniqueness result for the Nash equilibria of this pricing and 
bundling game. The estimation of input costs relies only on the necessary condi-
tions of Nash equilibrium. Therefore, multiple equilibria do not affect the properties 
of our estimated parameters. Multiple Nash equilibria would negatively affect both 
the estimation of bargaining parameters and the simulation analysis of unrealized 
policies. While we cannot prove uniqueness, we do numerically search for multiple 
equilibria by changing the starting values when computing an equilibrium by best-
response dynamics and do not find multiple equilibria.
D. Supply: Bargaining between Distributors and Channel Conglomerates
Input costs are the outcome of bilateral negotiations between upstream channels 
and downstream distributors. Bilateral negotiations have been studied extensively 
building on Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982), as detailed in Muthoo (1999). 
Chipty and Snyder (1999) use such models to analyze mergers in the multichannel 
television industry before the emergence of satellite television. This paper’s envi-
ronment differs from those models because payoffs depend on outcomes of bilateral 
negotiations that firms are not party to. These cross-negotiation externalities are due 
to downstream competition. Horn and Wolinsky (1988); Hart and Tirole (1990); 
McAfee and Schwartz (1994); and Segal and Whinston (2003) study these environ-
ments when one side of the market has one or two agents. Raskovich (2003) extends 
these models to capture the notion of pivotal buyers in the multichannel television 
industry. de Fontenay and Gans (2007) extend these models to allow for arbitrary 
numbers of agents on both sides of the market.
We too model this situation as a game involving the upstream channels, or con-
glomerates of channels, and the downstream distributors. Distributors and conglom-
erates meet bilaterally. Following industry practice, we assume MSOs negotiate on 
behalf of all their component systems and channel conglomerates bargain on behalf 
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of their component channels. They bargain à la Nash to determine whether to form 
an agreement, and if so, at what input cost. The ultimate payoffs are determined by 
downstream competition at the agreed-upon input costs.
We assume that the agreements between channel and distributor are simple linear 
fees: how much must the distributor pay to the channel each month for each sub-
scriber who receives the channel. In reality, payments are linear, but contain other 
provisions as well: descriptions of the service to be provided by each side, standards 
for technical service, marketing agreements, most favored nation clauses, division 
of advertising spots, tiering requirements, and auditing, confidentiality, and sever-
ability clauses. Few contain fixed monetary transfers, however, and if they do, they 
are negligible with respect to the contract’s total value. We model the contracts as 
only a linear fee for each distributor and channel.23
Let Ψ = { τ fc } be a set of input costs, a scalar for each pair of distributor and chan-
nel. In the bargaining stage, each conglomerate of channels and distributor meets 
separately and simultaneously. We denote a conglomerate by K and a channel by c. 
Let  τ f K be the vector of input costs for conglomerate K. We assume these meetings 
result in the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In each bilateral meeting,  τ f K 
maximizes firm f and conglomerate K’s bilateral Nash product:
(7)  N P f K ( τ f K ;  Ψ −f K ) = [  Π f ( τ f K ;  Ψ −f K ) 
 −  Π f (∞;  Ψ −f K ) ]  ζ f K  [ Π K ( τ f K ;  Ψ −f K ) −  Π K (∞;  Ψ −f K ) ] 1− ζ f K  ,
where  Π f is the sum over markets (ndm) of firm f ’s profit function in (6) and
   Π K ( τ f K ;  Ψ −f K ) =  ∑ 
c∈K
 
 ( ∑ 
f
 
 
 τ fc  Q fc (Ψ)) +  r c ad  t c (Ψ)
is conglomerate K ’s profit function before fixed costs;  Q fc (Ψ) is the total number of 
subscribers of channel c coming from distributor f, and  r c ad is the advertising rev-
enue of channel c per household hour watched. The endogenous viewership,  t c (Ψ), 
is recomputed in every downstream equilibrium using the consumer demand and 
viewership model. In words, the conglomerate profit function is the sum over dis-
tributors of license fee plus advertising revenue. Advertising revenue depends on 
the advertising rates and endogenous viewership of the conglomerate’s channels. If 
there is no agreement between a distributor and a conglomerate, then the input cost 
for each channel in the conglomerate is positive infinity.
Negotiations are simultaneous and separate, so  Ψ −f K , the set of all other input 
costs, is not known but conjectured;  ζ f K is the bargaining parameter of distributor f 
when meeting conglomerate K. Allowing  ζ f K ≠ 0.5 distinguishes asymmetric from 
symmetric Nash bargaining. Setting  ζ f K to zero is equivalent to assuming Nash-
Bertrand pricing behavior by the upstream firms.
23 Linear input costs above the production marginal cost, in this case zero, are often considered unrealistic 
because with downstream monopoly, the upstream and downstream firms can find fixed transfers that make both 
better off after changing the input cost to marginal cost. When there is downstream competition, however, commit-
ting to linear contracts is one way of avoiding the dissipation of profits due to such competition.
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Bargaining Equilibrium.—∀f, ∀K,  τ f K maximizes  NP fk ( τ f K ;  Ψ −f K ) given  Ψ −f K .
The interpretation of this equilibrium, due to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), is a 
Nash equilibrium between Nash bargains. To paraphrase, consider a simultaneous 
move game where the players are the bargaining pairs, each pair’s strategy is  τ f K , 
and each pair’s payoff is its Nash product. The bargaining equilibrium is the Nash 
equilibrium of that game. This setup does not allow for advantages due to informa-
tional asymmetries. Each distributor and each conglomerate send separate represen-
tatives to each meeting. Once negotiations start, representatives of the same firm do 
not coordinate with each other.24 We view this absence of informational asymme-
tries as a weakness of the bargaining model. In return, however, we gain tractability 
in determining how the threat of unilateral disagreement determines input costs in a 
bilaterally oligopolistic setting.
Another issue, also raised in Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and discussed in Raskovich 
(2003), is how to define the disagreement payoffs. Following the Nash equilibrium 
reasoning, we assume that agreements are binding in all contingencies. In previous 
versions of this paper, we have solved alternative cases where, if a pair disagrees, 
all other firms renegotiate conditional on the disagreeing pair dropping out forever. 
This case is reminiscent of the reasoning in the Shapley value.25 This alternative 
model generated different estimates of bargaining parameters, but did not affect our 
ultimate results. Solving this alternative game is computationally more challenging 
because one must compute payoffs for every possible configuration of agreement or 
disagreement. Without more industry-specific information on what might happen to 
other negotiations when a pair disagrees, and given that both models deliver similar 
ultimate conclusions, we chose the simpler model.
In our baseline specification, we treat each conglomerate as an indivisible block 
of channels. This implies, for example, that if bargaining breaks down between ABC 
Disney, which owns ESPN, ESPN 2, Disney Channel, ABC Family, SOAPNet, and 
other channels, and Comcast, then Comcast will not carry any of the ABC Disney 
channels. We also have solved a specification where we treat each channel as an 
individual firm. We assume that the disagreement profits for each of these channels 
are the profits from only that channel being dropped, rather than from all or a subset 
of channels from the conglomerate being dropped. Recent details of negotiations 
that became public provide evidence for both assumptions: Viacom threatened to 
pull all of its channels, including MTV, Comedy Central, and Nickelodeon, during 
negotiations with Time Warner Cable in late 2008, whereas Comcast’s content divi-
sion pulled Versus from DirecTV in 2009 following an unsuccessful negotiation, 
but continued to serve its other channels, such as Golf Channel and E!, through 
DirecTV. How multiproduct firms decide between potentially complex bargaining 
threats is an open question.
24 As a separate issue, we also ignore moral hazard. For example, we ignore the imperfectly observable choice of 
effort exerted by channels to make compelling programming following an agreement. Descriptions of the program-
ming are often written into the agreements, but it is not clear if there is a conflict between the two parties about these 
terms. Linear fees also may help resolve any more hazard issues upstream.
25 de Fontenay and Gans (2007) make an explicit connection with a cooperative solution that has the flavor of 
the Shapley value.
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IV. Estimation
We first estimate the distribution of preferences for channels,  γ i , using ratings 
data, jointly with the distribution of marginal utility of income,  α i , and nonprice 
preference parameters, ψ, using market share, price, and bundle characteristics data. 
We then use these demand estimates to separately estimate a parameterized cost 
function that predicts an input cost,  τ f K , for each pair of distributor f and chan-
nel conglomerate K. Finally, given the estimated demand and cost parameters, we 
choose bargaining parameters,  ζ fc , for each pair so that the bargaining model induces 
the estimated set of input costs in equilibrium. While it would be efficient to esti-
mate all the parameters jointly, we found it simpler to code and estimate the model 
as this sequence of separate steps.
A. Household Preference Parameters
We jointly estimate a parameterized distribution of γ with a parameterized 
distribution of  α i and nonprice preference parameters, ψ. The moments used in 
estimation are: (i) the fraction of households that watch zero hours by channel 
for the eight combinations of three demographic groups (black, age, and fam-
ily); (ii) mean hours watched per household per channel by demographic group; 
(iii) the covariance in DMA ratings with DMA mean demographics; (iv) mean 
hours watched per household per channel; (v) the cross-channel covariance in 
household hours watched; (vi) the aggregate cable and satellite market share by 
income level; and (vii) the covariance of demand-side instruments,  Z jndm , with the 
unobserved demand shock  ξ jndm .
Household i’s time spent viewing the programming on bundle j,  t ijndm depends on 
their vector of channel preferences,  γ i , and the channels available on bundle j,  C jndm . 
The ratings data are measurements of time spent viewing at the individual and 
market level. We estimate the distribution of γ by matching moments of the mod-
el’s predictions of time spent viewing to moments of the ratings data. We param-
eterize the distribution of γ as
  γ i =  χ i ◦ (Π o i +  v i ),
where  χ i is a vector whose components are indicator random variables
 χ ic = { 0,
1,
 w. Pr  ρ  o i c 
w. Pr 1 −  ρ  o i c .
In words, each household’s vector of channel preferences consists of individual 
channel preferences,  γ ic , which is zero for a given channel with some probability 
depending on household demographics. If  γ ic is not zero, it is a random variable 
that depends linearly on household demographics Π o i , where  o i is a vector of demo-
graphic attributes of household i. There is a layer of unobservable heterogeneity 
661CRAWFORD AND YuRuKOgLu: WELFARE OF BuNDLINgVOL. 102 NO. 2
in channel preferences due to the vector  v i , which we assume is drawn from a 
multidimensional distribution named g with exponential marginal distributions 
(whose parameters Λ we estimate) and a correlation structure Σ (which we also 
estimate). With this parametrization, the household maximization in equation (2) 
yields   t ijcndm (Π, ρ, Λ, Σ), each household’s time watched of channel c in bundle j.
This specification of tastes for channels captures the idea that some households 
don’t value some channels. This happens with probability  ρ  o i c . For those that do, we 
assume preferences are distributed as an exponential distribution shifted by demo-
graphic factors. Figure 3 demonstrates that viewing for the news channel CNN in 
our individual-level data is consistent with these assumptions. Similar patterns arise 
for all the channels in our analysis.
One can only observe ratings data for channels that a household has elected to 
receive. This introduces a selection issue: we are likely to observe the viewing deci-
sions of those households with strongest tastes for channels. We accommodate this 
“selection into bundles” by matching moments of the model’s predictions of time 
spent viewing conditional on bundle choice to ratings data which exhibit the same 
conditioning. The conditioning on bundle choice requires knowing parameters from 
the model of bundle choice (stage three of our model, given in equation (4)). We 
jointly estimate the parameters of the distribution of channel preferences together 
with bundle choice parameters similar to Lee (2010). This allows us to recover the 
Figure 3. Distribution of Viewing for CNN, MRI Data
Notes: This figure reports the distribution of viewing hours reported by our 200,000 + MRI households for CNN. 
The left panel shows the distribution of viewing for all MRI households, including the 63.3 percent that report no 
viewing. The right panel shows the distribution of viewing among the 36.7 percent of households that report posi-
tive amounts of viewing. Note the positive skewness in the distribution; similar patterns arise for all channels. This 
motivates our assumption that the marginal distributions of unobserved tastes for channels follows a mixture distri-
bution with a mass point at zero and an exponential distribution among those with positive values.
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unconditional distribution of preferences for channels, an important element for our 
counterfactual simulations.
Identification.—The population moments of the model’s predicted time spent 
viewing are sensitive to a limited set of parameters. One may casually think of 
those moments’ observed counterparts as “empirically identifying” these param-
eters. Using this terminology,  ρ  d i c is empirically identified by (i) the fraction of 
households that watch zero hours by channel by demographic group, Π by (ii), the 
mean hours watched by household by demographic group, and (iii), the covariance 
in DMA ratings with DMA demographics, g’s marginal distribution exponential 
parameters by (iv), the mean and variance in hours watched by household, and the 
correlation structure of g by (v), the cross-channel covariance of household hours 
watched (net of variance attributed to demographics). Identification of the other 
demand parameters is discussed below.
Positive correlation for a pair of channels could arise if a certain demographic group 
watches both channels, or even in the absence of demographic patterns, if those who 
watch one of the channels also watch the other. Negative correlation could arise if 
exclusive demographic groups watch each channel, for example, if rich households 
watch one of the channels and poor households the other, or even in the absence of 
demographic patterns, if those who watch one channel don’t watch the other.
We parameterize the distribution of  α i as  α i = α +  π p  y i , where  y i is household 
i’s income. We estimate α,  π p , and ψ as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) and 
Petrin (2002). This part of the estimation is based on equation (5). For given values 
of  π p and the distribution of γ, we find the values of  δ jndm which equate observed 
market shares with predicted market shares using the contraction mapping from 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Given  δ jndm , we estimate α and ψ by linear 
instrumental variables regression using instrument vector,  Z jndm = [  z jndm  w ndm ].
We assume observed nonprice product characteristics (dummy variables for 
nonchannel bundle characteristics such as firm, year, and tier name),  z jndm , are 
independent of  ξ jndm . We accommodate the endogeneity of price by instrument-
ing for it with  w ndm , where  w ndm is the average price of other cable systems’ bun-
dles within the same DMA as cable system n. Following Hausman (1997), these 
are often called “Hausman” instruments. These instruments have been used for 
demand estimation in settings such as Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) and 
Nevo (2001). They will be valid instrumental variables if, for bundle j in market 
n, the two standard conditions hold. First, they need be correlated with the price 
of bundle j in market n. This will be true if marginal costs are correlated with 
prices within n’s DMA outside market n. Labor costs and advertising rates are 
cost shifters that are plausibly correlated within DMAs, suggesting this is likely 
to be satisfied. Second, they need be uncorrelated with the unobserved demand 
shock in market n,  ξ jndm . As discussed in Section IIIB above, we anticipate ξ to 
contain unobserved characteristics of that system’s types and quality of service 
(e.g., Internet access). Cable systems are physically distinct entities for which 
local managers have wide authority, so bundle prices should be uncorrelated with 
noncompeting bundles’ unobservable characteristics. Of course, other instruments 
are possible; we consider and evaluate several in Section V;  π p is empirically iden-
tified by the total cable and satellite market share by income level.
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The model’s predicted time spent by household i watching channel c when sub-
scribing to bundle j is given by   t ijcndm (δ,  π p , Π, ρ, Λ, Σ) and depends on the data in 
addition to the indicated dependence on model parameters. The model’s predicted 
market share for household i for bundle j is   sijndm (δ,  π p , Π, ρ, Λ, Σ). Explicitly, the 
moment conditions used in estimation are
(1)
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where  ∑ ndm    is the sum over markets, DMAs, and months in our data,  N ndm is the 
number of such market-DMA-months,   tcd =  1 _  N nm   ∑ nm    ∑ j∈ b ndm     1 _ N  ∑ i=1 N   t ijcndm   sijndm 
is the average time spent watching channel c in DMA d, and  o d = 
 1 _  N nm   ∑ nm    ∑ j∈ b ndm     1 _ N  ∑ i=1 N  o indm is the average of demographic o in DMA d in the 
third moment (with  _ tc and  _ o the across-DMA averages of those),  Z rjndm is the rth 
instrument in  Z jndm , and we’ve suppressed the dependence of predicted time and 
market shares on the model’s parameters and data to economize on space. On the 
right-hand side of the first six moment conditions are the corresponding moments 
in our data;  r co cume is the share of MRI households of demographic o that have posi-
tive viewing to channel c,  t co is the average time MRI households of demographic 
o spend watching channel c,  σ  r cd ,  o d  is the across-DMA covariation in Nielsen rat-
ings for channel c, and demographic o,  r cd is the across-month average Nielsen 
rating for channel c in DMA d,  σ  t c ,  t  c ′   is the covariation in MRI households’ time 
spent watching each pair of channels, c and c′, and  s o is the market share for cable (and, separately, satellite) by demographic.
 N ondm is the total number of households that have demographic characteristic 
o in market ndm and D is the total number of DMAs. The set of demographic 
characteristics we use depends on the set of moments. For the set of moments 
associated with the first row, we use each of 8 combinations of black, family, and 
whether the head of household is aged over 55. For the set of moments associated 
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with the second and third rows, we use whether the household is a family or not, 
income level, race, whether the head of household has a bachelor’s degree, and the 
age of the head of household. For the moments associated with the second-to-last 
row, we use income quartiles only. For convenience, the labeling of the moments 
to the left of the brackets corresponds to their description at the beginning of this 
subsection.
B. Cost Estimation
National-average input costs, the necessary conditions implied by Nash equi-
librium in prices and bundles, and the observed prices and bundles identify input 
costs. National-average input costs are direct evidence. The rest is indirect evi-
dence; what could input costs have been given the Nash assumption and observed 
prices and bundles?
We parameterize  τ fc as a function of channel characteristics scaled by a function 
of firm and channel characteristics:
   τfc (η, φ) = ( η 1 +  η 2  τ c ) exp( φ 1 MSOSIZ E f +  φ 2 V I fc ),
where  τ c is the (observed) Kagan average input cost for channel c, MSOSIZ E f is 
firm f ’s total number of subscribers, and V I fc is the ownership share firm f has in 
channel c.26 While different channels may have different base rates, we assume 
the functional form of the effect of distributor size and vertical integration on 
input costs is the same for all channels. If Comcast has a 30 percent discount on 
the base rate of ESPN, it also has a 30 percent discount on the base rate of CNN, 
and for any other channel with which it is not vertically integrated. This is a 
restrictive parametrization, even more so because we don’t allow the coefficients 
to vary by year. It does, however, capture the distributor size effect, which is the 
most important factor driving differences in distributor’s fees for a given channel, 
and common knowledge in the industry.
A weighted average of  τ fc over firms predicts the national-average input cost for 
each channel c. The Kagan EBCN dataset’s channel input costs,  τ c , are the empirical 
counterpart of these averages. The first set of moment conditions is that the model’s 
predicted aggregate input costs should equal observed aggregate input costs with 
deviations from this relationship capturing measurement error in  τ c :27
  E f [  τfc (η, φ)] −  τ c = 0.
26 This information was collected from a number of different sources, primarily various years of SNL Kagan’s 
EBCN and historical issues of Multichannel News.
27 Kagan does not disclose where it obtains the data measured by  τ c . As these costs are widely considered propri-
etary business information, it is likely that they are only able to measure them with error.
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The first-order condition to maximize firm f ’s profits with respect to the price of 
bundle k in market ndm is
  
d  Π fndm ( b ndm ,  p ndm )  __ 
d p kndm  =  ∑ j∈ B fndm  
 
 (   p jndm −  ∑ 
c∈ C jndm 
 
 
  τ fc )  d s jndm ( b ndm ,  p ndm )  __ d p kndm  
 +  s kndm ( b ndm ,  p ndm ).
This says that bundle k’s optimal price is equal to the input cost of bundle k plus a 
markup that depends on demand conditions and the other bundles in the market. This 
condition holds in a Nash equilibrium for each firm in each market, given all other 
bundles and prices. Given the estimated demand parameters and observed prices 
and bundles, we solve for the implied marginal cost of each bundle,  ∑ c∈ C jndm     τ fc , 
which we call   m c jndm . The second set of moment conditions is that the difference 
between   m c jndm and  ∑ c∈ C jndm      τfc (η, φ) should have zero covariance with the size of 
bundle j’s MSO and the number of own vertically integrated channels included in 
bundle j and year dummy variables and tier-name dummy variables. This is analo-
gous to adding a bundle-specific error term measuring unobserved shocks to bundle 
marginal costs,   m c jndm , and assuming this error is uncorrelated with the size and 
vertical integration status of firm f.28
The Nash assumption also implies the necessary conditions of profit-maximizing 
bundle choice for each firm given the price and bundle choices of its rivals. Our 
estimation uses a subset of these necessary conditions as moment inequalities. The 
logic is the same as for the optimal pricing conditions. There are only certain cost 
parameters that satisfy that adding or dropping channels is less profitable than keep-
ing the observed bundles. We punish candidate parameter estimates if they imply 
that altering observed bundles are profitable deviations for distributors. Firms may 
have unobservable information about these decisions that, if left unaddressed, would 
bias our estimates. We assume that the firm’s unobservable information is fixed for a 
given channel across markets, and sum the profit of changing from observed choices 
across opposite decisions for a given firm and channel pair. For example, we may 
see Comcast carry Comedy Central in one market and not in another. Our moment 
inequality conditions are that the sum of the difference between the observed and 
deviation profits should be weakly positive.
Because adding or dropping channels is a discrete choice, the implied restrictions 
are inequalities. We follow the setup in Pakes et al. (2007). From the Nash assump-
tion, the profits to firm f in market n are higher for its chosen and observed bundles 
and prices than for alternate bundles:
  Π fndm (( b fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p fndm ,  p −fndm )) ≥  Π fndm (( b′ fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p′ fndm ,  p −fndm )).
28 Shocks to marginal costs include the same unobserved labor costs and advertising rates motivating our choice 
of instruments. These are likely to depend on idiosyncratic features of market n and are unlikely to be correlated 
with firms’ expansion and integration decisions.
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We approximate  Π fndm using the profits predicted from the model,  r fndm , which of 
course depend on input costs.
  Π fndm (( b fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p fndm ,  p −fndm )) ≈  r fndm (( b fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p fndm ,  p −fndm )) 
 +  ν fndmb,1 +  ν fndmb, 2 ,
 ν fndmb,1 is the error in the approximation that is unknown to the firms when making 
their bundling decision;  ν fndmb,1 contains measurement error and firm uncertainty; ν fndmb, 2 is the error in the approximation known to firms at that time;  ν fndmb, 2 contains, 
for example, the loss a vertically integrated channel would suffer if its integrated 
distributor carried a competing channel.
Following Pakes et al. (2007), we define
 Δ Π fndm (b, b′ ) ≡  Π fndm (( b fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p fndm ,  p −fndm )) 
 −  Π fndm (( b′ fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p′ fndm ,  p −fndm ))
and
 Δ r fndm (b, b′ ) ≡  r fndm (( b fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p fndm ,  p −fndm )) 
 −  r fndm (( b′ fndm ,  b −fndm ), ( p′ fndm ,  p −fndm ))
  ν fndm, b, b ′ ,1 ≡  ν fndmb, 2 −  ν fndmb′, 2 
  ν fndm, b, b ′ , 2 ≡  ν fndmb, 2 −  ν fndm b ′ , 2 .
We assume that for two markets ndm and ndm′ and the same firm,  ν fndm, b, b ′ , 2 =  ν fnd m ′ , b, b ′ , 2 =  ν f, b, b ′ , 2 .
Therefore, any unobservable error in the approximation of profits for adding or 
dropping channels is common to all markets for a given firm. For example, the 
benefit of adding Turner Classic Movies, a channel vertically integrated with 
Time Warner Cable, that is not accounted for in the function Δr is the same in any 
Time Warner Cable market.
This assumption and the Nash condition imply the optimal bundling moment 
conditions:
 E[Δ r fndm (b, b′ ) + Δ r fnd m ′  (b′, b)] ≥ 0.
The estimation routine punishes input cost parameters whose implied r functions 
violate this condition.
The optimal pricing condition identifies the cost parameters on its own. 
Furthermore, in its absence the cost parameters are partially identified. Stacking 
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the three sets of moment conditions together yields our full set of input costs 
moment conditions:29
Agg. Input Costs
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We estimate η and φ by minimizing the empirical analog of these moment condi-
tions, with each weighted equally in the estimation.
C. Channel-Distributor Bargaining-Parameter Estimation
The unobserved parameters of the bargaining game are each conglomerate and 
distributor’s pairwise bargaining parameters  ζ f K . We use no additional data in iden-
tifying the bargaining parameters. They are functions of the estimated cost and 
demand parameters and the protocol of the bargaining game.
In practice, we choose the values of  ζ f K to minimize the distance of the bargaining 
model’s equilibrium input costs and estimated input costs. The demand and pricing 
model implies a set of input costs that deliver higher profits for both channel and 
distributor than no agreement. If this set is nonempty, it will usually be an uncount-
able set. In this case, the two firms will disagree over what point in the set should 
be chosen. The conglomerate will most often prefer higher input costs, and the dis-
tributor will always prefer lower input costs. The bargaining model, for a fixed vec-
tor of  ζ K , resolves this disagreement. Part of the resolution is due to the bargaining 
protocol and the respective parties’ outside options. The rest is due to the bargaining 
parameters  ζ K . The estimated input costs are an estimate of the actual resolution 
point. Therefore, the estimated bargaining powers are the  ζ K that imply equilibrium 
input costs from the bargaining model as close as possible to estimated input costs.
Identification of  ζ f K relies on two key ingredients. First, we are able to estimate pair-
specific input costs. Second, the marginal cost of upstream production is commonly 
known to be zero. When costs are neither observed nor separately estimated, they are 
not separately identified from the bargaining parameters. The analyst would not know 
if an input cost is high because marginal cost is high or because the upstream firm’s 
bargaining parameter is high. In this application, because of these two ingredients, we 
are able to separately identify the bargaining parameters from cost parameters.
29 There are additional moments for the Nash Pricing conditions that we use, but suppress for presentation. These 
are the covariances between year and tier dummy variables with the difference between implied and predicted 
marginal cost.
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The ultimate payoffs for each of the parties involved in bargaining is determined 
after downstream competition has taken place. When solving for equilibrium input 
costs, we recompute, for each potential input cost, the viewership, subscription, and 
pricing decisions at each stage of the model. These equilibrium quantities determine 
how much advertising revenue is sold and how much revenue the conglomerate 
receives from each distributor. We model the advertising revenue as a linear function 
of household hours watched. We estimate a channel-specific advertising price using 
Kagan advertising revenue data and Nielsen ratings data. Each channel’s estimated 
advertising price is simply its advertising revenue divided by its average national 
household rating.
Computing equilibrium input costs is computationally demanding. For both the esti-
mation of the bargaining parameters and the counterfactual, we simplify the computa-
tional burden by assuming there is one large market and one small market. We further 
assume there is one cable distributor for the large market and a separate cable dis-
tributor for the small market. There are two “national” satellite providers that compete 
with the cable operators in each market, but must set the same prices and packages in 
both markets. The simplified industry structure reduces the number of players in the 
bargaining game, which in turn reduces the computational burden of estimation. The 
downstream local market structure is the same as in the estimation, and in reality during 
the time period of the sample: one cable and two satellite options per market. Without 
a simplification, it would be necessary to solve the bargaining game with many simul-
taneous negotiations, and to have the downstream competition take place in thousands 
of markets. The simplification allows a connection to the estimated cost parameters by 
having different-sized distributors while economizing on computational time.
V. Estimation Results
A. Demand Estimates
Table 3 presents estimates of the price-sensitivity parameter (α), the impact of 
income on price sensitivity ( π p ), and differences across demographics in tastes for 
the outside good. The estimated price-sensitivity parameter,   α, is − 0.29 (0.00) for 
OLS and − 0.50 (0.03) for IV using prices of other firms in the same DMA as 
the key price instrument.30 This suggests that our instrumental variables strategy is 
working as theory would predict.31
30 We explored using other price instruments, including the prices of the same firm in other markets (used in 
Crawford 2008), the total number of subscribers to the firm to which that system belonged (a cost shifter analogous 
to that used in Section IVB), and channel dummies (approximating changes in marginal costs due to the inclusion 
of additional channels). The first yielded a qualitatively similar estimate of price sensitivity (  α = − 0.34 (0.03)), 
the second a lower but imprecise estimate (  α = − 0.16 (0.31)), and the third a much larger estimate (  α = − 1.09 
(0.01)). As all but the last of these models are just-identified, there are no overidentifying restrictions to facilitate 
testing their validity as instruments. The hypothesis that the channel dummies are orthogonal to the demand error 
is soundly rejected by a Hansen J-test ( p-value = 0.000). The combination of strong theoretical justification and 
better fit with average industry margins (described below) led us to prefer prices of the same firm in other markets 
as our price instrument.
31 We also allowed for the possibility of correlation between the instrument and error by calculating the bounds 
estimator of Nevo and Rosen (forthcoming). Given the plausible correlations between data and error in our setting 
and the conditions on the correlations in the data outlined in Nevo and Rosen (2011), these were only able to say 
that the true estimate is at least as negative as our preferred IV estimate.
669CRAWFORD AND YuRuKOgLu: WELFARE OF BuNDLINgVOL. 102 NO. 2
In markets that offer basic, expanded basic, and digital basic cable services, this 
yields an average own price elasticity for basic of − 4.12, for expanded basic of 
− 6.34, for digital basic of − 13.11, and for satellite of − 5.35.32 These are on par 
with most previous estimates in the literature33 and imply median (mean) margins 
across the services in our data of 44 percent (46 percent), in the range of the esti-
mates of average margins above programming costs of 56 percent estimated by the 
FCC (FCC 2009, Table 5).34
Table 4 reports, for each channel in our analysis, information about the distribu-
tions of WTP implied by our estimates. The first 3 columns of the table report, for a 
simulated set of 20,000 households, the mean and standard deviation in WTP for the 
channel among those that value it positively and the share of households that value 
it positively. Figure 4 presents estimates of the full marginal distribution of WTP 
among the same households for a subset of these channels.
The WTP estimates mimic the patterns in the Nielsen ratings and MRI consumer 
survey data. The mean and standard deviation of WTP for ESPN ($3.08, $4.46) are 
higher than for Bravo ($0.65, $0.67) because the mean and variance of ESPN’s rat-
ings are higher than Bravo’s. The estimated share of households with positive tastes 
for TNT (0.72) is higher than for the Golf Channel (0.12) because more consumers 
report watching TNT than the Golf Channel.
The dispersion in WTP for any given channel can be decomposed into the dis-
persion that can be attributed to demographics and the one that cannot. Dispersion 
due to demographics comes through the impact of demographics on tastes (i.e., Π or 
ρ  d i c ) while further dispersion comes through the distribution of unobserved tastes for 
channels, g. On average across channels, five percent of the dispersion in WTP can 
32 Table 4 in online Appendix B reports the full table of own- and cross-price elasticities.
33 The FCC (2002) (− 2.19); the GAO (2003) (− 3.22); Beard et al. (2005) (− 2.5); Chipty (2001) (− 5.9); and 
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) (− 1.5 for EB, − 3.2 for DB, − 2.4 for Satellite), have all separately estimated the 
average own price elasticity of cable services, using market share regressions, diverse datasets, and instrumental 
variables techniques.
34 This is a meaningful comparison as we do not impose the restrictions implied by optimal pricing in the demand 
estimation. Margins are defined as (p − c)/p. FCC (2009) estimates total programming expenditure at $15.8 billion 
and total Basic, Expanded Basic, and Digital Tier revenue at $35.6 billion in 2005. 1 – 15.8/35.6 = 56 percent.
Table 3—Price Sensitivity and Nontelevision Preference Parameters
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Price sensitivity (IV) −0.50 0.03
Price sensitivity (OLS) −0.29 0.00
Price income interaction 0.11 0.01
Family × outside good 0.00 0.04
Income × outside good 0.64 0.17
Black × outside good 0.70 0.24
Hispanic × outside good 3.97 4.11
Asian × outside good 3.24 1.92
Bachelors × outside good 2.45 0.36
Age × outside good 1.07 0.29
Notes: This table reports our GMM results for a subset of demand parameters, including the 
estimated mean marginal utility of income, α, the impact of income on marginal utility,  π yp , 
and differences across demographics in tastes for the outside good. Also reported is the esti-
mated mean marginal utility from the same estimation procedure without price instruments, 
which we denote OLS.
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be attributed to demographics, although this can be much higher for individual chan-
nels.35 Columns three and four provide an example of demographic effects by report-
ing mean WTP for family and black households, respectively. Family households are 
35 We calculate this by regressing, for each channel, WTP for the channel among 20,000 simulated households 
on their demographics and then constructing a weighted average of the  R 2 from those regressions using the mean 
WTP for the channel as a weight.
Table 4—Estimated WTP
Channel Mean WTP SD WTP
Share 
positive
Mean WTP 
family HH
Mean WTP 
black HH Highest correlated channel
ABC Family Channel 1.59 2.24 0.49 1.68 1.80 TV Land
AMC 1.40 1.59 0.51 1.15 1.83 MSNBC
Animal Planet 2.05 3.02 0.58 2.08 1.81 National Geographic Channel
Arts & Entertainment 2.10 2.63 0.58 1.90 2.23 History Channel
BET Networks 1.27 2.74 0.34 1.34 4.54 MTV2
Bravo 0.65 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.76 ESPN
Cartoon Network 2.06 4.01 0.49 2.27 2.54 Nickelodeon
CNBC 2.02 2.97 0.55 1.84 2.01 CNN
CNN 5.38 5.91 0.68 4.94 8.30 Fox News Channel
Comedy Central 1.51 2.39 0.61 1.52 1.34 MTV
Country Music TV 0.89 1.56 0.57 0.89 0.79 Food Network
Court TV 1.76 3.11 0.50 1.79 2.23 Arts & Entertainment
Discovery Channel 2.70 2.99 0.65 2.55 2.67 Animal Planet
Disney Channel 1.43 2.51 0.65 1.52 1.72 Nickelodeon
E! Entertainment Television 1.15 1.69 0.62 1.16 1.10 VH1
ESPN 3.08 4.46 0.64 2.86 3.63 ESPN 2
ESPN 2 1.80 3.12 0.62 1.75 2.02 ESPN
Food Network 2.06 3.25 0.71 2.08 2.18 TV Guide Channel
Fox News Channel 4.07 5.89 0.60 4.10 4.69 CNN
Fox Sports Net 1.63 2.82 0.55 1.58 1.55 ESPN 2
FX 1.45 2.59 0.51 1.47 1.41 USA Network
GSN 0.74 2.97 0.08 0.83 1.51 ESPN 2
Golf Channel 0.52 1.86 0.12 0.38 0.68 CNN
Hallmark Channel 1.43 3.96 0.16 1.47 2.09 Country Music TV
HGTV 2.60 4.67 0.42 2.59 3.02 Food Network
History Channel 2.70 4.06 0.40 2.53 3.09 Arts & Entertainment
Lifetime 2.25 3.73 0.31 2.46 5.57 AMC
MSNBC 1.69 3.23 0.29 1.38 2.61 AMC
MTV 1.22 2.28 0.59 1.25 1.36 VH1
MTV2 0.71 1.23 0.52 0.79 0.63 VH1
National Geographic Channel 1.03 1.60 0.69 1.04 0.92 Animal Planet
Nickelodeon 1.31 2.55 0.50 1.45 1.35 Disney Channel
Oxygen 0.41 0.44 0.60 0.49 0.64 Disney Channel
Syfy 1.74 2.97 0.54 1.74 1.82 USA Network
SoapNet 0.49 1.04 0.42 0.52 0.58 TBS Superstation
Speed Channel 0.33 0.41 0.56 0.41 0.19 Versus
Spike TV 1.18 2.00 0.57 1.18 1.07 The Weather Channel
TBS Superstation 2.05 2.85 0.69 1.98 2.23 TNT
The Weather Channel 1.71 1.83 0.70 1.59 1.66 Spike TV
TLC 1.82 2.81 0.61 1.84 1.57 Discovery Channel
TNT 2.36 3.10 0.72 2.31 2.54 USA Network
Toon Disney 0.44 1.69 0.13 0.57 0.90 Cartoon Network
Travel Channel 0.76 2.27 0.15 0.80 0.74 Nickelodeon
TV Guide Channel 0.50 0.75 0.57 0.54 0.60 Food Network
TV Land 2.06 3.40 0.59 2.11 2.45 ABC Family Channel
USA Network 2.12 3.19 0.51 2.19 2.62 TNT
Versus 0.23 0.31 0.49 0.28 0.21 Speed Channel
VH1 0.74 1.28 0.56 0.75 0.90 MTV2
WE: Women’s Entertainment 0.45 0.69 0.50 0.49 0.53 National Geographic Channel
Notes: This table reports information of the distribution of WTP for channels implied by our estimates. The first two 
columns report the mean and standard deviation in WTP for each channel among those that value it positively. The 
third column reports the estimate share of households that do so. The fourth and fifth columns report estimated WTP 
among family and black households. The last column reports the channel estimated to have the highest correlation 
in WTP for each channel. WTP is measured in year 2000 dollars per month per household.
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estimated to prefer channels offering family-oriented programming like the Disney 
Channel and Nickelodeon. Black households are estimated to generally value channels 
more highly, with a strong effect for BET ($4.54 versus $1.27 among all households).
Correlations in WTP between pairs of channels can arise through demographic 
groups sharing tastes for those channels, or through the correlations estimated in g. 
Most pairwise correlations are between − 0.1 and 0.1, although some pairs of chan-
nels have stronger correlations. We estimate that ESPN and ESPN2 have a correla-
tion in household WTP of 0.67, ESPN and Fox Sports of 0.39, MTV and SoapNet of 
− 0.13, and CNBC and Comedy Central of − 0.19. The last column in Table 4 shows 
that the channel estimated to have the highest correlation in tastes for each channel 
accords with intuition in who is likely to be the target audience of the programming 
on both channels.
B. Input Cost Estimates
We estimate median marginal costs for bundles to vary from $11.08 for basic to 
$20.74 for digital basic packages.
The demand estimates are combined with Nash pricing and bundling assumptions 
and EBCN average input costs per channel to estimate differences in per-channel 
Figure 4. Estimated WTP for a Subset of Channels
Notes: Reported is the share of 20,000 households that value each network positively and the distribution of WTP 
among that subset. In each figure, the y-axis reports households and the x-axis reports WTP in 2000 dollars.
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input costs across distributors. We attempted to project the estimated bundle-mar-
ginal costs onto the channels in the bundle, but did not find enough variation in 
the bundles to do so with any statistical power. By bringing the extra information 
contained in EBCN’s average costs and the Nash in bundling assumptions, we are 
able to estimate not only channel-specific input costs, but also how those input costs 
differ for downstream firms based on size and vertical integration.
The estimated input cost parameters, η and φ, in Table 5 imply that Comcast, a 
distributor with roughly 24 million subscribers, faces input costs 17 percent below 
those of a small distributor.36 The estimated effect of vertical integration is negative 
and statistically different from zero. Of the three moment conditions, the EBCN 
average costs help pin down the overall level of input costs while the Nash in pricing 
and bundling assumptions help pin down how those input costs vary across distribu-
tors of different sizes and/or integration statuses. For robustness, the second set of 
columns of Table 5 report the same estimates excluding the Nash in bundle moments 
conditions. There are few differences.
Most of the patterns in the data generating these estimates are clear from Table 6. 
It shows that observed prices and estimated marginal costs are lower on average for 
large distributors, conditional on the characteristics of the bundle. Consequently, we 
estimate large distributors to have lower per-channel input costs. Prices for bundles 
are lower for distributors who offer many of their own vertically integrated chan-
nels, although we find that estimated marginal costs are not.37 One might expect 
these distributors to at least carry their vertically integrated channels more often 
36 We report standard errors using the conservative estimates in Pakes et al. (2007, Section 3.1.3) (hereafter, 
PPHI). Andrews and Soares (2010) introduce an alternative procedure to that in PPHI for calculating confidence 
sets and test statistics that are not asymptotically conservative (and, more generally, have the correct asymptotic 
size). As our primary results do not depend on hypothesis tests of these parameters and the Andrews and Soares 
method is more costly to implement, we use the simpler PPHI formulas.
37 The vertical integration results in both our structural and reduced-form models were sensitive to how we 
treated outlier values of marginal costs. Sample statistics for the marginal cost estimates for each of our 25,000 bun-
dles had a mean of 9.0 and a standard deviation of 70.7. The standard deviation was so large due to some very small 
and some very large values (themselves driven by very small and very large market shares). In the analysis, we 
chose to truncate our estimated costs from below at zero and from above at the price of the bundle. The mean and 
standard deviation of our truncated costs was 12.0 and 9.1. We found no evidence of effects of vertical integration 
in the structural analysis with the untruncated costs; the evidence for vertical integration effects reported above 
is for the truncated costs. The positive and significant vertical integration result in the reduced-form regressions 
is surprising and due, we suspect, to the difficulty projecting marginal costs onto channel dummies without the 
restriction that the weighted average across distributors be on par with industry averages reported by EBCN (as in 
the structural analysis). A median regression of marginal costs on firm size and integration status yields a negative 
(but statistically insignificant) effect of vertical integration.
Table 5—Input Cost Parameters
All moments No bundling moments
Parameter Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Constant 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.00
Kagan scale 0.91 0.00 0.93 0.00
MSO size − 0.08 0.00 − 0.10 0.00
Vertical integration dummy − 0.14 0.01 − 0.16 0.01
Notes: This table reports the impact of various factors on our estimated input costs. Kagan scale refers to the input 
cost for that channel as estimated by Kagan World Media (2008). Distributor (MSO) size is measured in tens of 
millions of households. Vertical integration is the share of the channel owned by that distributor (between 0 and 1).
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than other distributors, but this is not true for most of the vertically integrated chan-
nels we examine.38
C. Bargaining Parameter Estimates
We report our estimates of channel conglomerates’ bargaining parameters relative 
to distributors in Table 7. Smaller values indicate relatively more bargaining power 
for channels. We estimate that bargaining parameters are usually between 0.25 and 
0.75. These estimates discourage assuming take-it-or-leave-it offers as the esti-
mated bargaining parameters are neither zero, which would imply channels choose 
the most attractive mutually agreeable input cost for themselves, nor one, which 
would imply that distributors do. We estimate that distributors generally have higher 
bargaining parameters than channel conglomerates for small-channel conglomer-
ates (Comcast, Scripps, Rainbow Media, Discovery, Hallmark, Lifetime, Oxygen, 
Weather Channel, and TV Guide), but that the situation is reversed for large-chan-
nel conglomerates (ABC Disney, Viacom, NBC Universal, News Corporation, and 
Time Warner). Among distributors, small cable operators and satellite providers 
have slightly less estimated bargaining power than large cable operators.
38 Table 5 in online Appendix B demonstrates this for the carriage of channels owned by Time Warner between 
2004 and 2007. It is true, however, that integrated distributors are more likely to carry their own networks for 
some new channels that are too small to be included in either the TMS or Nielsen viewing data and are therefore 
not part of the analysis in this paper. For example, both CNN, a large and highly watched news channel, and CNN 
International, a smaller channel targeted at an international audience, were vertically integrated with Time Warner 
Cable during the sample period. Pricing and carriage decisions for bundles with CNN do not differ systematically 
for Time Warner Cable compared to other distributors. CNN International, on the other hand, is carried much more 
often by Time Warner Cable than by other distributors. More analysis would be necessary to determine whether 
Time Warner Cable’s specific markets have higher tastes for international news, but the pattern holds conditional on 
market characteristics. Chipty (2001) focuses on a small and specific group of vertically integrated channels using 
data from 1991 and finds that integration does affect costs and carriage. Here, we show that this is indeed true if one 
looks at certain less-established channels, but not for the established channels between 1997 and 2007.
Table 6—Regression Analysis of Distributor Size on Price and Estimated Marginal Cost
Price regression Estimated marginal cost regression
Coeff. SE t-statistic Coeff. SE t-statistic
Distributor size − 0.0955 0.0079 − 12.12 − 0.055 0.0107 − 5.10
Number of integrated channels − 0.1668 0.0684 − 2.44 0.473 0.093 5.07
Dummy variables
 Channels Yes Yes
 Year Yes Yes
 Tier Yes Yes
 Number of bundles Yes Yes
 Year × tier Yes Yes
 Number of bundles × tier Yes Yes
N 25,490 25,490
 R 2 0.563 0.169
F(271, 25,218) 111.92 18.98
Notes: This table reports the results of regressions designed to highlight the identification of our input cost esti-
mates. The first set of columns reports the results of a regression of bundle prices on the size of the distributor offer-
ing the bundle and a sum of the number of vertically integrated channels in the distributor’s bundle. We condition 
on various variables that might affect marginal costs. The second set of columns reports the results of a regression 
of our estimated bundle marginal costs on the same covariates.
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VI. The Welfare Effects of à la Carte
A. Theoretical Predictions
For a fixed set of channels and ignoring capacity constraints, the socially optimal 
allocation would deliver every channel in existence to each household that has a 
positive willingness to pay for that channel. Bundling excludes households that have 
positive willingness to pay for some channels, but not enough for the full bundle to 
justify its price. À la carte pricing of channels allows for those excluded under bun-
dling to purchase some channels. À la carte, however, partially excludes households 
that have positive valuations for channels that do not exceed the prices at which the 
channels are being sold. Which of these two effects dominates determines the total 
welfare effect of à la carte, and is one output of the counterfactual exercise.
How the surplus generated by multichannel television service is split between 
and within consumers and firms is also of importance to policymakers. Bundling 
theory under monopoly suggests that consumers with highly variant preferences, as 
we estimate television households to be, are better off under à la carte pricing in the 
short run (Adams and Yellen 1976). The theory under oligopoly is less established 
and offers ambiguous predictions about the effects of à la carte on consumer wel-
fare. Furthermore, neither of these literatures considers the welfare effects allowing 
for renegotiation of linear contracts between upstream and downstream firms.
In the long run, the conclusions of economic theory on the welfare effects of 
à la carte are even less clear. Many opponents of à la carte claim smaller channels 
appealing to niche tastes will become unprofitable and exit in an à la carte environment. 
Table 7—Conglomerate Bargaining Parameters
Conglomerate Big cable Small cable DirecTV Dish Network
ABC Disney 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.17
Viacom 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.53
NBC Universal 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.51
Comcast (Content Division) 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.66
Scripps 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.58
News Corporation 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.32
Rainbow Media 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.67
Discovery Networks 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.63
Time Warner 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.37
Hallmark 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.71
Lifetime 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
Oxygen 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.70
Weather Channel 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
TV Guide 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76
Notes: This table reports our estimated bargaining parameters for channel conglomerates versus distributors of 
various types. Smaller values of the bargaining parameters indicate relatively more bargaining power for chan-
nels. Channel conglomerates are ABC Disney (ABC Family Channel, Disney Channel, ESPN, ESPN2, Soap Net, 
Toon Disney), Viacom (BET Networks, Comedy Central, Country Music TV, GSN, MTV, MTV2, Nickelodeon, 
Spike TV, TV Land, VH1), NBC Universal (Arts and Entertainment, Bravo, CNBC, MSNBC, Syfy, USA Network), 
Comcast (E! Entertainment Television, Golf Channel, Versus), Scripps (Food Network, HGTV), News Corporation 
(Fox News Channel, Fox Sports Net, FX, National Geographic Channel, Speed Channel), Rainbow Media (AMC, 
WE: Women’s Entertainment), Discovery Networks (Animal Planet, Discovery Channel, History Channel, TLC, 
Travel Channel), Time Warner (Cartoon Network, CNN, Court TV, TBS Superstation, TNT). Hallmark, Lifetime, 
Oxygen, Weather Channel, and TV Guide are single-channel “conglomerates.” See the end of Section IV for 
descriptions of the distributor types.
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Others claim they may invest less in program quality. We do not model the impact of à 
la carte on these long-run outcomes. Further research of their evolution in an equilib-
rium setting is necessary to assess these effects of à la carte regulations.
B. Counterfactual Simulations
Supporters have suggested various implementations of à la carte policies. These 
range from requiring firms that bundle to allow consumers to opt out of programming 
and receive a rebate (as in the Family and Consumer Choice Act of 2007) to separately 
priced theme tiers to offering separately priced individual channels. We simulate three 
outcomes: full à la carte (ALC), theme tiers (TT), and bundle-sized pricing (BSP).
In all our simulations, we make a number of assumptions consistent with a short-
run analysis. We assume that preferences are invariant to the policy change. As dis-
cussed above, we assume that channels do not alter their programming following 
the policy change, nor do new channels enter or existing channels exit. We assume 
the technical, administration, billing, and marketing costs of firms are the same 
when firms are allowed to bundle as when firms are forced to sell channels à la 
carte. Finally, we assume that households don’t incur any extra cognitive costs from 
choosing from the larger choice set.
In what follows, we describe in some detail our preferred results. They represent 
our best estimates of what outcomes would be under various counterfactual policy 
environments. We recognize, however, that there are many assumptions underlying 
the specific numbers we present below. In online Appendix B, we assess the robust-
ness of our conclusions to some of the assumptions underlying our analysis.
C. Full ALC
Our baseline simulation has one large and one small cable market as in the bargain-
ing power estimation. Each is served by its own cable provider and two “national” 
satellite providers. The demographic distribution for each market is that of the whole 
United States.
Table 8 summarizes our baseline results. We report economic outcomes implied 
by our estimates under three scenarios. The first scenario is a bundling equilibrium 
where each distributor competes by setting a single fixed fee for a bundle of all the 
49 channels in our analysis. Table 9 lists the included channels. The second scenario 
is a Full ALC equilibrium without renegotiation. In this counterfactual, each distrib-
utor competes by setting a fixed fee and separate à la carte prices for each channel 
in the specification. The input costs they face do not allow for renegotiation, how-
ever. That is, the input costs are the same as those we estimate in a world with only 
bundles. While unrealistic in television markets, this is the maintained assumption 
in most of the theory literature analyzing this issue. The last scenario is again Full 
ALC, but allows for the renegotiation of input costs taking as given the bargaining 
parameters we estimate for each channel conglomerate-distributor pair.39
39 In this equilibrium, we made the simplifying assumption that distributors set ALC prices equal to their agreed-
upon input costs and earned profits only on fixed fees for access to their platforms. We did so for computational 
reasons. Solving for renegotiated input costs in the full ALC equilibrium requires repeatedly solving for downstream 
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We also simulate the effects of ALC on channels’ advertising revenue. For each 
channel, we assume that the price per minute of advertising they receive under bun-
dling will also be what they receive under ALC. The change in their advertising 
revenue is then simply given by their current advertising revenue times the percent-
age change in their viewing implied by the counterfactual. This is converted to a 
per-household basis when calculating total revenue in Tables 8 and 9.
The top panels in Table 8 present general features of the various equilibria. We see 
that while most households purchase some cable or satellite service in the bundling 
equilibrium, this is even greater under à la carte as households unwilling to pay the 
full cost of the bundle opt to purchase a smaller number of channels. As expected, 
households under ALC purchase fewer than the full complement of channels.
The bottom panels in Table 8 summarize the welfare effects of ALC. Comparing 
first the bundling and Full ALC without renegotiation, we see that channel profits drop 
prices at candidate input costs. Numerical errors in those pricing equilibria appear to propagate into the bargain-
ing equilibria at tractable convergence tolerances, making that optimization nonsmooth. It also makes it extremely 
time-consuming as the pricing equilibria must be repeated at each iteration in the solution of the input costs for each 
distributor-conglomerate pair and these in turn must be iterated to obtain the bargaining equilibrium. We feel comfort-
able with this assumption for two reasons. First, before imposing it we were finding downstream markups of between 
− 5 and 10 percent for input costs close to but not quite reaching equilibrium values. Second, it is consistent with the 
predictions of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002), who find cost-based two-part tariffs char-
acterize the equilibria in some settings, analyzing competition among price-discriminating firms. In online Appendix 
B, we allow for downstream margins to be 10 percent rather than 0 and obtain qualitatively similar results.
Table 8—Baseline Counterfactual Results: Full À La Carte
Bundling
ALC 
no reneg
Percent 
change
ALC 
with reneg
Percent 
change
Nonwelfare outcomes
 Cable & sat penetration 0.880 0.998 13.3 0.993 12.8
 Total affiliate fees $18.22 $18.22 0.0 $36.98 103.0
 Mean consumer expn $27.63 $21.07 − 23.8 $28.24 2.2
 Number channels received 42.8 22.0 − 48.5 19.3 − 54.9
 Number channels watched 22.2 22.0 − 0.5 19.3 − 12.8
Welfare outcomes
 Channel profits
  Total license fee rev $16.03 $7.95 -50.4 $15.44 − 3.7
  Total advertising rev $13.38 $14.71 10.0 $14.73 10.1
  Total channel revenue $29.41 $22.67 − 22.9 $30.16 2.6
 Distributor profits $11.59 $13.11 13.1 $12.81 10.4
 Total industry profits $41.00 $35.78 − 12.7 $42.97 4.8
 Mean consumers surplus $45.82 $54.59 19.2 $45.91 0.2
 Total surplus $86.82 $90.37 4.1 $88.88 2.4
Notes: This table reports the results of our baseline counterfactual simulations of full à la carte (ALC) pricing poli-
cies on prices and welfare. The economic environment consists of one large and one small cable market (served by 
one large and one small cable operator) and two “national” satellite providers, each offering access to their plat-
form and approximately 50 cable channels. In the bundling equilibria reported in column one, each firm competes 
by pricing a single bundle of channels. In both ALC equilibria, each firm competes by setting a fixed fee and then 
separate prices for each offered channel. Columns two and three report results for ALC without allowing input-
market renegotiation (i.e., with input costs at their values in the bundling equilibrium); columns four and five allow 
renegotiation. In the renegotiation equilibrium, we impose that downstream prices equal the renegotiated input 
costs. See footnote 39 in the text for details. Average outcomes (e.g., Total Affilate Fees, Number of Channels) are 
weighted across distributors according to their estimated market shares. Dollar values are 2000 dollars per US tele-
vision household per month.
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Table 9—Input Cost and Welfare Effects by Channel
Input cost effects Profit effects
Channel
Bundling 
input cost
ALC input 
cost
Percent 
change
Total 
bundling 
revenue
Total 
ALC 
revenue
Percent 
change
Percent 
change 
license 
fee rev.
Percent 
change 
advert. 
rev.
ABC Family Channel $0.32 $0.83 156.9 $0.46 $0.58 24.5 29.9 15.9
AMC $0.32 $0.54 67.8 $0.41 $0.43 3.9 −2.2 16.9
Animal Planet $0.20 $0.97 372.8 $0.25 $0.53 109.3 150.0 9.8
Arts & Entertainment $0.31 $1.08 250.6 $0.57 $0.91 58.8 109.4 13.3
BET Networks $0.26 $0.58 127.3 $0.56 $0.55 − 1.7 − 26.8 15.4
Bravo $0.27 $0.51 92.3 $0.39 $0.40 1.4 2.0 0.6
Cartoon Network $0.26 $0.78 199.1 $0.54 $0.62 14.7 19.4 11.3
CNBC $0.34 $0.93 170.6 $0.53 $0.70 30.7 43.7 13.6
CNN $0.49 $2.92 498.0 $0.81 $1.98 144.1 265.3 7.2
Comedy Central $0.23 $0.66 187.5 $0.61 $0.72 18.2 43.2 5.8
Country Music TV $0.18 $0.56 211.1 $0.26 $0.29 10.8 17.7 0.2
Court TV $0.22 $0.85 276.1 $0.35 $0.49 41.5 63.9 12.2
Discovery Channel $0.34 $1.47 339.6 $0.59 $1.16 95.9 182.0 10.0
Disney Channel $0.77 $0.70 − 8.9 $0.68 $0.27 − 59.6 − 59.6 0.0
E! Entertainment Television $0.30 $0.48 62.0 $0.41 $0.38 − 7.6 − 15.8 7.2
ESPN $2.44 $0.87 − 64.5 $3.80 $2.33 − 38.6 − 75.9 9.5
ESPN 2 $0.33 $0.71 114.2 $0.46 $0.48 3.9 1.8 7.7
Food Network $0.19 $0.85 352.9 $0.49 $0.71 44.0 122.1 4.5
Fox News Channel $0.36 $1.83 411.8 $0.70 $1.27 82.4 171.8 8.9
Fox Sports Net $1.56 $0.79 − 49.3 $1.51 $0.46 − 69.4 − 77.4 8.9
FX $0.36 $0.68 90.3 $0.61 $0.58 − 5.3 − 19.8 10.2
GSN $0.19 $0.42 124.3 $0.23 $0.12 − 47.7 − 76.0 20.7
Golf Channel $0.32 $0.14 − 57.5 $0.37 $0.10 − 72.6 − 99.9 14.9
Hallmark Channel $0.17 $0.63 272.5 $0.33 $0.32 − 3.7 − 28.6 17.1
HGTV $0.25 $1.04 310.8 $0.60 $0.82 38.4 77.2 15.2
History Channel $0.29 $2.29 699.5 $0.53 $1.16 120.5 237.0 13.5
Lifetime $0.32 $0.85 166.8 $0.81 $0.88 9.3 − 4.6 16.7
MSNBC $0.26 $0.69 168.3 $0.33 $0.31 − 4.8 − 14.6 16.1
MTV $0.37 $0.47 28.3 $1.02 $0.93 − 8.4 − 44.6 8.6
MTV2 $0.17 $0.54 223.0 $0.19 $0.21 9.4 12.4 − 0.5
National Geographic Channel $0.29 $0.65 120.9 $0.34 $0.32 − 5.1 − 6.2 − 1.2
Nickelodeon $0.48 $0.45 − 7.5 $1.38 $1.23 − 10.5 − 61.8 12.5
Oxygen $0.24 $0.09 − 63.7 $0.31 $0.16 − 48.0 − 76.1 16.5
Syfy $0.27 $0.70 160.0 $0.55 $0.63 15.3 18.3 13.0
SoapNet $0.22 $0.44 98.8 $0.24 $0.15 − 37.9 − 47.0 3.7
Speed Channel $0.27 $0.42 56.7 $0.32 $0.18 − 43.9 − 51.8 − 21.3
Spike TV $0.29 $0.60 106.7 $0.54 $0.53 − 1.1 − 8.6 5.8
TBS Superstation $0.38 $0.88 132.0 $0.89 $1.04 16.5 33.1 6.6
The Weather Channel $0.22 $0.60 174.4 $0.34 $0.56 64.7 102.4 15.1
TLC $0.27 $0.83 205.9 $0.42 $0.57 35.7 55.5 9.5
TNT $0.84 $0.93 11.1 $1.35 $1.15 − 15.2 − 33.6 6.9
Toon Disney $0.21 $0.39 86.1 $0.24 $0.10 − 57.9 − 83.2 17.7
Travel Channel $0.26 $0.45 69.7 $0.32 $0.16 − 50.5 − 74.9 14.4
TV Guide Channel $0.16 $0.14 − 16.2 $0.24 $0.18 − 24.3 − 49.4 15.9
TV Land $0.21 $0.86 301.1 $0.34 $0.53 57.0 92.8 11.9
USA Network $0.51 $0.84 65.0 $1.13 $1.17 3.7 − 12.2 14.1
Versus $0.25 $0.29 17.7 $0.26 $0.13 − 51.8 − 60.4 − 8.9
VH1 $0.24 $0.44 80.8 $0.55 $0.50 − 9.7 − 27.3 1.4
WE: Women’s Entertainment $0.22 $0.32 46.1 $0.26 $0.19 − 28.5 − 39.8 5.1
Total $18.22 $36.98 103.0 $29.41 $30.16 2.6 − 3.7 10.1
Notes: This table reports the results by channel of the input cost and profit consequences from our baseline, Full à 
la Carte (ALC), counterfactual with input-cost renegotiation. As in Table 8, downstream prices are set at the rene-
gotiated input costs; see footnote 39 for details. The first three columns report weighted averages (across distribu-
tors) of our estimated per-subscriber input costs under bundling and ALC equilibria (and their associated change). 
They are measured in 2000 dollars per subscriber per month. Distributors must pay the bundle-input cost for all 
their subscribers in the bundling counterfactual, but pay the ALC input cost only for those that choose to subscribe 
under the ALC counterfactual. The remaining columns summarize the profit effects by channel. The fourth through 
seventh columns report the total (license fee plus advertising) profit effects, while the last two columns break out 
the percentage change for each of these components. Profits are measured in 2000 dollars per household per month.
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significantly (despite an increase in advertising revenue), distributor profits increase 
slightly, and overall industry profits fall (by 12.7 percent). Consistent with the theory 
literature, consumer surplus rises by 19.2 percent, driven both by reduced expenditure 
among those that previously purchased the bundle and the addition of households that 
were previously excluded from the market. The increase in consumer surplus out-
weighs the fall in profits, meaning total surplus rises by 4.1 percent.
Allowing for renegotiation in the last set of columns changes these conclusions. 
Most input costs increase, some dramatically so. The total for the channels in our 
analysis increases by an estimated distributor-share-weighted average of 103.0 per-
cent, increasing prices paid by households. Mean consumer expenditure increases an 
estimated 2.2 percent.
These input cost increases also have important effects on welfare. Instead of reduc-
ing channel profits, all of channel, distributor, and industry profits are estimated 
to increase, the latter by 4.8 percent.40 Estimated consumer surplus is effectively 
unchanged (+ 0.2 percent). The predicted change in total welfare is still positive, 
but lower than before renegotiation as some households no longer purchase some 
channels of moderate value whose input costs and thus prices rise.
Table 9 breaks down the input-cost and profit effects by the channels included in 
our analysis.41 The first three columns report the estimated share-weighted monthly 
license fee per subscriber under bundling, the license fee under ALC with renegotia-
tion, and the percentage change. There is considerable heterogeneity across chan-
nels in the effects of ALC. Some channels are estimated to increase their license fees 
by 300 percent or more (Animal Planet, Food Network, TV Land), while others are 
estimated to cut their fees (Nickelodeon, Oxygen, TV Guide).
There are similarly heterogeneous effects on channel revenues. The remaining 
columns in Table 9 report total (license fee plus advertising) per-household revenue 
to each channel under bundling and ALC with renegotiation, the change between 
them, and the percentage change in the component (license fee, advertising) rev-
enues. Total-channel affiliate-fee revenue decreases by an estimated 3.7 percent 
and advertising revenue increases by 10.1 percent, the latter driven by increased 
viewership by households that did not purchase under bundling. There is significant 
estimated heterogeneity across channels, with some predicted to lose 40 percent or 
more of their revenue (GSN, Oxygen, Versus) while others are predicted to increase 
revenue by 100 percent or more (Animal Planet, CNN, History Channel).
40 This need not be surprising. There is tremendous uncertainty in the industry about outcomes in an ALC world. 
Neither channel nor distributors may know the structure of demand for channels and/or bargaining outcomes under 
ALC. Our results suggest ALC would be profitable for the industry. Of course, any equipment, administration, bill-
ing, or marketing costs arising under ALC would reduce these profits, further reducing consumer surplus and likely 
causing total surplus to fall.
41 The results described in this table should be interpreted under the maintained assumption that the more house-
holds watch a channel, the more they value that channel. In online Appendix B, we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis 
to explore the consequences of allowing channels that are watched less by households to nonetheless be valued 
more (and vice versa) and find that it may yield underestimates of WTP for channels for which household tastes 
are high for early minutes but decline quickly with minutes watched (e.g., sports programming) and overestimates 
of WTP for channels for which household tastes are more constant across minutes. See the Robustness subsection 
below and in online Appendix B for more detail about this issue.
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D. Theme Tiers and Bundle-Sized Pricing
We also simulated two alternative regulatory scenarios. In the BSP scenario (Chu, 
Leslie, and Sorensen 2011), we assume downstream firms continue to offer a bundle 
of all the channels, but add to this a package of fifteen channels assembled by each 
household according to its tastes. In the TT scenario, we assume downstream firms 
offer five tiers of service (Sports, News, Family and Education, Music and Lifestyle, 
and General) from which a household can choose any combination.42 In this sce-
nario, distributors also charge a fixed fee. In both scenarios, distributors and channel 
conglomerates renegotiate input costs. Table 10 reports the results.
Outcomes under both BSP and TT are worse for consumers. In each case, input costs 
are estimated to rise almost as much as under Full ALC, but consumer choice is more 
restricted, reducing their benefits. Under BSP, consumers are able to choose their 15 
favorite channels (and many do), but pay an amount similar to Full ALC while getting 
fewer channels. This reduces their consumer surplus (by 8.8 percent). Total industry 
profit is similar and total surplus falls (by 2.3 percent). Outcomes under theme tiers are 
more dramatic. Households watch as many channels as Full ALC, but now pay much 
more to do so (consumer expenditure increases an estimated 33.8 percent). Estimated 
consumer surplus therefore falls considerably (− 22.0 percent). Channel profits soar, 
yielding an aggregate predicted industry-profit increase of 24.2 percent. Total surplus 
is effectively unchanged (− 0.2 percent) relative to the bundling baseline.
E. Results Summary
Our findings confirm the intuition regarding the likely effects of ALC described in 
Section I. When we do not allow for renegotiation (Table 8, columns 2–3), we turn off 
the input cost–raising bargaining effect and find consumer surplus increases consider-
ably (+ 19.2 percent) and industry profits fall (− 12.7 percent). As suggested by much 
of the bundling literature, for fixed input costs, we find bundling transfers surplus 
from consumers to firms. When we allow for renegotiation (Table 8, columns 4–5), 
costs rise (+ 103.0 percent), prices follow suit, and these consumer surplus gains are 
effectively eliminated (+ 0.2 percent). Things are even worse for consumers under 
bundle-sized pricing and theme tiers (Table 10, columns 4 and 7). The bundling of 
channels within each of these alternatives eliminates much of the consumer surplus 
benefits accruing under Full ALC and still almost doubles input costs. This worst-of-
both-worlds outcome significantly lowers consumer surplus (by 8.8 percent or 22.0 
percent). Our qualitative conclusion is that consumers could in principle benefit from 
mandatory à la carte at existing input costs, but would not in practice benefit due to 
input cost renegotiation in an à la carte world.
F. Robustness
Our goal is to measure accurately the welfare effects of à la carte pricing in mul-
tichannel television markets. As such, it is important to have confidence that this 
42 See the notes to Table 10 to see the identities of the channels included in each tier.
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fundamental conclusion is robust and not sensitive to particular assumptions under-
lying the model, estimation, or counterfactual simulations. In online Appendix B, 
we consider the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions on demand, 
cost, and bargaining, including allowing for positive channel margins for distribu-
tors in the counterfactual, different distributional assumptions for preferences, turn-
ing off unobserved correlation in tastes, and allowing renegotiated input costs to 
be half or double what we estimate. We also conduct a Monte Carlo exercise in a 
simplified economic environment to explore the likely consequences of relaxing our 
assumption that a channel that is watched more is necessarily valued more.
Table 7 in online Appendix B shows that alternative assumptions about the 
downstream margins and the shape of and correlation between household prefer-
ences for channels yield qualitatively similar results: estimated consumer surplus 
changes between − 5.4 percent and 0.2 percent, profits between 2.4 percent and 
12.8 percent, and total surplus between − 1.7 percent and 6.0 percent. Bargaining 
outcomes are much more important for predicting surplus: if renegotiated input 
costs were to rise by half (double) the 103.0 percent we estimate, estimated 
consumer surplus would increase by 18.5 percent (fall by 27.6 percent). This 
Table 10—Alternative Counterfactual: Full ALC, Bundle-Sized Pricing, and Theme Tiers
Levels Percent change
Bundling Full ALC
Bundle- 
sized 
pricing
Theme 
tiers Full ALC
Bundle- 
sized 
pricing
Theme 
tiers
Nonwelfare outcomes
 Cable & sat penetration 0.880 0.993 0.987 0.977 12.8 12.1 11.0
 Total affiliate fees $18.22 $36.98 $34.44 $35.49 103.0 89.1 94.9
 Mean consumer expn $27.63 $28.24 $28.60 $36.98 2.2 3.5 33.8
 Number channels received 42.8 19.3 17.0 34.7 − 54.9 − 60.3 − 18.8
 Number channels watched 22.2 19.3 15.8 19.2 − 12.8 − 28.7 − 13.4
Welfare outcomes
 Channel profits
  Total license fee rev $16.03 $15.44 $17.97 $25.26 − 3.7 12.0 57.5
  Total advertising rev $13.38 $14.73 $14.44 $13.95 10.1 7.9 4.3
  Total channel revenue $29.41 $30.16 $32.40 $39.20 2.6 10.2 33.3
 Distributor profits $11.59 $12.81 $10.63 $11.72 10.4 − 8.3 1.1
 Total industry profits $41.00 $42.97 $43.03 $50.93 4.8 5.0 24.2
 Mean consumers surplus $45.82 $45.91 $41.79 $35.73 0.2 − 8.8 − 22.0
 Total surplus $86.82 $88.88 $84.82 $86.66 2.4 − 2.3 − 0.2
Notes: This table reports the results of alternative counterfactual simulations of various policy interventions on prices 
and welfare. The economic environment is as in Table 8. Columns one, two, and five report the counterfactual out-
comes in bundling and full à la carte (ALC) environments as in Table 8. The remaining columns report counterfactual 
outcomes under Bundle-Sized Pricing and Theme Tiers. In the Bundle-Sized Pricing counterfactual, each downstream 
distributor competes by offering a full bundle of all the channels and a second bundle of 15 channels, the identities of 
which may be chosen by each household. In the Theme Tier counterfactual, each downstream distributor competes 
by setting a fixed fee and offering five theme tiers from which the household can choose any combination. The theme 
tiers are Sports (ESPN, ESPN 2, Fox Sports Net, Golf Channel, Speed Channel, Versus), News (CNBC, CNN, Fox 
News Channel, MSNBC), Family and Education (ABC Family Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Channel, Disney 
Channel, History Channel, National Geographic Channel, Nickelodeon, TLC, Toon Disney), Music and Lifestyle 
(Bravo, Country Music TV, E! Entertainment Television, Food Network, HGTV, Lifetime, MTV, MTV2, Oxygen, 
SoapNet, TV Guide Channel, VH1, WE: Women’s Entertainment), and General (AMC, Arts and Entertainment, 
BET Networks, Cartoon Network, Comedy Central, Court TV, FX, GSN, Hallmark Channel, Syfy, Spike TV, TBS 
Superstation, The Weather Channel, TNT, Travel Channel, TV Land, USA Network). All counterfactuals allow for 
input-market renegotiation. Dollar values are 2000 dollars per US television household per month.
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merely emphasizes the importance of estimating a bargaining game and simu-
lating counterfactual bargaining outcomes in order to understand accurately the 
effects of unbundling in television markets.
Relaxing the assumption that channels that are watched more are valued more in our 
Monte Carlo exercise yielded interesting insights. Table 1 in online Appendix B shows 
that a range of channel-specific economic outcomes are misestimated when households 
watch some channels less but nonetheless value them more. In particular, WTP, prices, 
and market shares for these channels are underestimated while the same outcomes for 
those that are watched more but valued less are overestimated. Adding across channels, 
however, causes these errors to cancel out and, in the Monte Carlo, yields statistically 
similar predictions for the overall welfare effects of à la carte policies.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has combined a structural model of the multichannel television industry 
with market and viewership data in order to evaluate the welfare effects of proposed à 
la carte pricing regulations. We extend a standard demand model to a setting of joint 
purchasing and viewership decisions and combine it with a model of distributor pric-
ing and bundling, and channel-distributor bargaining. We estimate the model using 
demand, pricing, viewership, and cost data from the industry. We use the estimated 
model to simulate an unrealized regulatory environment: à la carte pricing regulations. 
We allow for the renegotiation of supply contracts under à la carte and find that total 
input costs for the 49 channels in our analysis would rise by 103.0 percent. We com-
pare the distributions of consumer and producer surplus under a simulated bundling 
setting with those under à la carte allowing for these cost increases and predict that, in 
the short run, consumer welfare would change between − 5.4 percent and 0.2 percent 
under à la carte regulations, while industry profits and total surplus would increase 
between 2.4 percent and 12.8 percent, and − 1.7 percent and 6.0 percent, respectively. 
Implementation or marketing costs of à la carte could make it worse for all.
One could improve our analysis of bundling in the multichannel television indus-
try in future work by trying to relax some of the most important maintained assump-
tions in our analysis. Relaxing the assumption that more time watched implied higher 
willingness to pay for channels, allowing for asymmetric information in channel-
distributor bargaining, and analyzing for the long-run effects of à la carte regulations 
on entry, exit, and the content and quality of channels would all be valuable.
Appendix: The Multichannel Television Industry
The multichannel television market is a two-sided market. Cable and satellite sys-
tems provide a platform connecting households with both program producers and 
advertisers. Figure A1 provides a graphical representation of the supply chain by 
which programming is produced and sold to households and which audiences are 
created and sold to advertisers. Downward arrows represent the flow of programming 
from content providers to households.43 Upward arrows represent the creation and 
43 The distribution rights to content (e.g., a television program like Crocodile Hunter) is purchased by a televi-
sion channel (e.g., CBS or The Discovery Channel) and placed in its programming lineup. These channels are 
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sale of audiences to advertisers. The various submarkets that characterize the pur-
chase and sale of content or audiences are indicated at each step in the chain. In this 
paper, we focus on the for-pay distribution and advertising markets.
Cable television systems choose a portfolio of television channels, bundle them 
into services, and offer these services to consumers in local, geographically sepa-
rate, markets. Satellite television systems similarly choose and bundle channels into 
services, but offer them to consumers on a national basis.
All cable and satellite systems offer four main types of channels. Broadcast 
channels are advertising-supported television signals broadcast over the air in the 
local cable market by television stations and then collected and retransmitted by 
cable systems. Examples include the major, national broadcast channels—ABC, 
CBS, NBC, and FOX—as well as public and independent television stations. Cable 
programming channels are advertising- and fee-supported general and special-inter-
est channels distributed nationally to systems via satellite. Examples include MTV, 
CNN, and ESPN. Premium programming channels are advertising-free entertain-
ment channels. Examples include HBO and Showtime. Pay-per-view are specialty 
channels devoted to on-demand viewing of the most recent theatrical releases and 
then distributed to consumers in one of two ways. Broadcast networks, like ABC, CBS, and NBC, distribute their 
programming over the air via local broadcast television stations at no cost to households. Cable channels like The 
Discovery Channel, MTV, and ESPN distribute their programming via cable or satellite television systems that 
charge fees to consumers. The dashed arrow between content providers and consumers represents the small but 
growing trend to distribute some content directly to households via the Internet.
Figure A1. Television Programming Industry
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specialty sporting events. Broadcast channels and cable channels are typically bun-
dled and offered as basic service while premium programming channels are typically 
unbundled and sold as premium services.44 Distributors now offer cable channels on 
multiple services, called expanded basic and digital services.
Most advertising space is sold by channels, but a few minutes per hour are sold 
by the local cable system.45 Advertising revenues account for nearly one-half of 
total channel revenues. Advertising revenues depend on the total number and demo-
graphics of viewers. These figures, called ratings, are measured by Nielsen Media 
Research (hereafter, Nielsen). Ratings are measured at the designated metropolitan 
area (DMA) level, of which there are 210 in the United States. In urban areas, the 
DMA corresponds to the greater metropolitan area. DMAs usually include multiple 
cable systems with different owners.
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